preprint · CogPrints (University of Southampton) · 2005

From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia

Dennis Nicholson

Cited by 0Abstract and details only

Abstract

The Knowledge argument based on the grey Mary thought experiment cannot be claimed as a basis for rejecting physicalism. First, because it is flawed, being so formulated as to predetermine the outcome of the thought experiment in favour of a refutation of physicalism. Second, because, once this is recognised, it becomes clear that there is one - and only one - account of the qualia-physical relationship that will permit physicalism to survive the thought experiment itself. It is suggested that the position in question is worthy of further consideration as a reasonable candidate theory for a physicalist account of qualia.

Cite this paper

APA 7

Nicholson, D. (2005). From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia. CogPrints (University of Southampton).

MLA 9

Nicholson, Dennis. “From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia.” CogPrints (University of Southampton), 2005.

Chicago

Nicholson, Dennis. 2005. “From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia.” CogPrints (University of Southampton).

Harvard

Nicholson, D. (2005) ‘From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia’, CogPrints (University of Southampton).

BibTeX

@misc{nicholson2005flaw,
  title = {{From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia}},
  author = {Nicholson, Dennis},
  journal = {CogPrints (University of Southampton)},
  year = {2005}
}

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