article · Philosophical Studies · 2011
Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument
Cited by 49Open access
Abstract
According to Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist raised in a black and white room and bestowed with complete physical knowledge, cannot know certain truths about phenomenal experience. This claim about knowledge, in turn, implies that physicalism is false. I argue that the knowledge argument founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know the relevant experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing on the truth of physicalism or (ii) once the obstacles have been removed, Mary can know the relevant truths. If we give Mary the epistemological capabilities necessary to draw metaphysical conclusions about physicalism, she will, while trapped in the black and white room, be able to know every truth about phenomenal experience.
Cite this paper
Rabin, G. O. (2011). Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument. Philosophical Studies, 154(1), 125–147. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9705-6
Rabin, Gabriel Oak. “Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 154, no. 1, 2011, pp. 125–47, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9705-6.
Rabin, Gabriel Oak. 2011. “Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument.” Philosophical Studies 154 (1): 125–47. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9705-6.
Rabin, G.O. (2011) ‘Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument’, Philosophical Studies, 154(1), pp. 125–147. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9705-6.
@article{rabin2011conceptual,
title = {{Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument}},
author = {Rabin, Gabriel Oak},
journal = {Philosophical Studies},
volume = {154},
number = {1},
pages = {125--147},
year = {2011},
doi = {10.1007/s11098-011-9705-6}
}Made from the index record. Check names, capitalisation and page numbers against the paper. Need another style? AI for Research has over 10,000.