article · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 1998
The Problem of Qualia
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Abstract
One of the major concerns for the contemporary philosophy of mind involves the problem of qualia.The word qualia refers to our subjective experience of the world and includes the properties of our experience that cannot be located in the world external to our minds.For example, the ineffable feel of a blue experience when one looks at the sky, or the pain one feels when one is stuck with a pin.These sensations are the essence of our experience and yet cannot be pointed to in the external world.This paper is based upon a talk I gave to the 1998 cognitive science class and will follow the same structure of that talk.To start, I will describe the problem of qualia and will show that it poses a real problem for physicalist and functionalist theories of the mind.Further highlighting the problem, I will talk about androids.These entities of the future are functionally identical to humans, however it is claimed that if they existed, they would have no qualia or any conscious experience whatsoever.The final section of this paper will be concerned with Frank Jackson's Knowledge argument.The Knowledge argument is a very powerful thought experiment, which is supposed to show that physicalism about the mind is false.
Cite this paper
Silby, B. (1998). The Problem of Qualia. PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation).
Silby, Brent. “The Problem of Qualia.” PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation), 1998.
Silby, Brent. 1998. “The Problem of Qualia.” PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation).
Silby, B. (1998) ‘The Problem of Qualia’, PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation).
@article{silby1998problem,
title = {{The Problem of Qualia}},
author = {Silby, Brent},
journal = {PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation)},
year = {1998}
}Made from the index record. Check names, capitalisation and page numbers against the paper. Need another style? AI for Research has over 10,000.