article · 2007

Transferability and Proofs

Kenny Easwaran, Grice On Meaning

Cited by 0Abstract and details only

Abstract

[Grice, 1957] argues for the following account of “non-natural meaning ” (i.e., ordinary linguistic meaning): “A meantNN something by x ” is roughly equivalent to “A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention. ” [Grice, 1957, p. 384] In particular, he adds, “A’s intending that the recognition should play this part implies... that he does not regard it as a foregone conclusion that the belief will be induced in the audience whether or not the intention behind the utterance is recognized.” The motivation for this particular condition is a series of examples in which A utters x with the intention of inducing a belief, and with the intention that this intention be recognized, but where (because the recognition of the intention plays no essential role in the formation of the belief) we don’t want to say that A “means ” anything by x. These examples include Herod presenting Salome with the head of John the Baptist (to get her to believe that John the Baptist

Cite this paper

APA 7

Easwaran, K., & Meaning, G. O. (2007). Transferability and Proofs.

MLA 9

Easwaran, Kenny, and Grice On Meaning. “Transferability and Proofs.” 2007.

Chicago

Easwaran, Kenny, and Grice On Meaning. 2007. “Transferability and Proofs.”

Harvard

Easwaran, K. and Meaning, G.O. (2007) ‘Transferability and Proofs’.

BibTeX

@article{easwaran2007transferability,
  title = {{Transferability and Proofs}},
  author = {Easwaran, Kenny and Meaning, Grice On},
  year = {2007}
}

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