article · 1998

A Timing Attack on RC5

Howard Heys

Cited by 0Abstract and details only

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the application of a timing attack to the RC5 symmetric block cipher. The analysis is motivated by the possibility that a naive implementation of RC5 could result in the data-dependent rotations taking a time that is a function of the data. Such implementations are possible, for example, in a digital hardware or 8-bit microcontroller environment. Based on the assumption that accurate timing measurements are available for individual encryptions, the methodology of deriving key bits using timing information from a set of ciphertexts is outlined and it is shown that, for the nominal version of RC5, with only about 2000 ciphertexts and their associated timings, the cryptanalysis can be applied to determine 5 bits of the last half-round subkey with high probability. Further, using a set of about 64000 random ciphertexts, the attack can be applied to determine the entire subkey of the last half-round with high probability and, if 10^6 random ciphertexts and thei...

Cite this paper

APA 7

Heys, H. (1998). A Timing Attack on RC5.

MLA 9

Heys, Howard. “A Timing Attack on RC5.” 1998.

Chicago

Heys, Howard. 1998. “A Timing Attack on RC5.”

Harvard

Heys, H. (1998) ‘A Timing Attack on RC5’.

BibTeX

@article{heys1998timing,
  title = {{A Timing Attack on RC5}},
  author = {Heys, Howard},
  year = {1998}
}

Made from the index record. Check names, capitalisation and page numbers against the paper. Need another style? AI for Research has over 10,000.