Dhananjoy Dey · International Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology · 2012
In this paper we describe an improved version of HF -hash [7] viz. R-hash: Hash Function Using Random Quadratic Polynomials Over GF(2). The compression function of HF -hash consists of 32 polynomials with 64 variables over GF(2), which were taken from the first 32 polynomials of HFE challenge -1 by forcing last 16 variables as 0. The mode operation used in computing HF -hash was Merkle-Damgard. We have randomly selected 32 quadratic non-homogeneous polynomialshaving 64 variables over GF(2)in case of R-hash to improve the security of the compression function used in HF -hash. In designing R-hash, we have also changed the mode operation used in HF-hash, because of the theoretical weakness found in the Merkle-Damgard construction. In this paper we will prove that R-hash is more secure than HF-hash and SHA-256 as well as we will show that it is also faster than HF-hash.
Cited by 2
University of Oulu Repository (University of Oulu) · 2012
Cited by 0
Yu‐Guang Yang, Jing-Lin Bi, Dan Li et al. · International Journal of Theoretical Physics · 2019
Cited by 17
Ashish Kumar, Somitra Kumar Sanadhya, Praveen Gauravaram et al. · Lecture notes in computer science · 2010
Cited by 3
Edem Swathi, G. Vivek, G. Sandhya Rani · 2016
Hash functions were introduced in cryptology in the late seventies. These are used as a tool to protect the data integrity. Soon it has become clear that they are very useful to solve other security issues in computer networks and in telecommunications. Cryptographic hash function is a mathematical concept, mainly used as a part of the digital signature schemes. In this paper, we describe hashing, cryptography, cryptographic hash function and their properties. It gives an overview of hash functions, compression functions which are designed from scratch and made out of block ciphers.
Cited by 11Open access
Junfeng Fan · 2014
Abstract. This document describes ASIC and FPGA implementations of the hash function Hamsi. The results show that Hamsi can be ef-ficiently implemented in hardware with small area. We also point out several optimization methods targeting different design goals. 1 Design Guideline The current implementations are straightforward realizations of the Hamsi hash function family. In other words, higher throughput or lower footprint should be achievable by applying certain optimization methods. 2
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Liang Lu, Máire O’Neill, Earl E. Swartzlander · 2009
The ECHO hash function was developed for the NIST cryptographic SHA-3 hash function competition. To evaluate ECHO's performance, high-speed and low-cost ASIC architectures have been designed. The results show that the high-performance architecture can achieve a fastest throughput among AES-based hash function design reported to date among the SHA-3 candidates.
Cited by 2
Elena Andreeva, Bart Preneel · Lecture notes in computer science · 2009
Cited by 23
Neven, Gregory, Smart, Nigel, Warinschi, Bogdan · Explore Bristol Research · 2009
We provide two necessary conditions on hash functions for the Schnorr signature scheme to be secure, assuming compact group representations such as those which occur in elliptic curve groups. We also show, via an argument in the generic group model, that these conditions are sufficient. Our hash function security requirements are variants of the standard notions of preimage and second preimage resistance. One of them is in fact equivalent to the Nostradamus attack by Kelsey and Kohno (Eurocrypt~2006), and, when considering keyed compression functions, both are closely related to the ePre and eSec notions by Rogaway and Shrimpton (FSE~2004). Our results have a number of interesting implications in practice. First, since security does not rely on the hash function being collision resistant, Schnorr signatures can still be securely instantiated with SHA-1/SHA-256, unlike DSA signatures. Second, we conjecture that our properties require $O(2^n)$ work to solve for a hash function with $n$-bit output, thereby allowing the use of shorter hashes and saving twenty-five percent in signature size. And third, our analysis does not reveal any significant difference in hardness between forging signatures and computing discrete logarithms, which plays down the importance of the loose reductions in existing random-oracle proofs, and seems to support the use of ``normal-size'' groups.
Cited by 0
Yi, X., Lam, K.Y. · National University of Singapore · 2014
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Processor For Ipsec, Yong Kyu Kang, Dae Won Kim et al. · 2002
This paper presents the implementation of hash functions for IPSEC chip. There is an increasing interest in high-speed cryptographic accelerators for IPSec applications such as VPNs (virtual private networks). Because diverse algorithms are used in Internet, various hash algorithms are required for IPSec chip. Therefore, we implemented SHA-1, HAS-160 and MD5 in one chip. These hash algorithms are designed to reduce the number of gates. SHA-1 module is combined with HAS-160 module. As the result, the required logic elements are reduced by 27%. These hash algorithms have been implemented using Altera's EP20K1000EBC652-3 with PCI bus interface.
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Guido Bertoni Joan, Joan Daemen, Gilles Van Assche · 2008
We present an approach to design cryptographic hash functions that builds on and improves the one underlying the Panama hash function. We discuss the properties of the resulting hash functions that need to be investigated and give a concrete design called RadioGat un that is quite competitive with SHA-1 in terms of performance. We are busy performing an analysis of RadioGat un and present in this paper some preliminary results.
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Lyudmil Tserovski · 2008
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Milan Tuba · 2009
Use of computer networks is expanding in many important areas such as e-government, e-business, e-learning etc. In any such communications network it is crucial to be able to authenticate both the contents and the origin of a message. Digital signatures (based on public key schemas) are used for authentication and ideally they should provide the same guarantees as a handwritten signatures: unforgeability (only the author of a message should be able to sign his name to a message), undeniability (the author of a message should not be able to deny he signed it at a later stage) and authentication (the signature should allow the contents of the message to be authenticated).
In order to provide message authentication the signature must depend on the contents of the message being signed. Two major problems with the public key-based signature schemes are that they are existentially forgeable and if the message is long then the signature will take a long time to compute. To overcome both of these problems hash functions that map a (possibly lengthy) message M to a small digest h(M) are used. Among other desirable properties (the length of h(M) should be small, the function h should be a publicly known one-way function, it should destroy algebraic relationships between messages and signatures), an interesting one is that it should be 'collision-resistant', that is it should be difficult to find two messages with the same hash value.
To find a collision the birthday attack is used, which shows that attacker may not need to examine too many messages before he finds a collision. If attacker generates random messages and computes their hash values then with probability at least ½ he finds a collision after generating √(2|R|) messages, where |R| is the total number of possible hash values for the corresponding hash function. The real situation is even worse. In previous estimates it is always assumed that the hash function is regular, meaning that all points in the range have the same number of pre-images under h. If h is not regular, fewer trials are required. Here we examine different types of irregularity of the hash function and the quantitative changes in the required number of trials to find a collision.
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Navajit Saikia, Prabin Kumar Bora · International Journal of Information Security · 2013
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Stefan Kölbl, Elmar Tischhauser, Patrick Derbez et al. · Designs Codes and Cryptography · 2019
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Quan Yuan, Mehdi Tibouchi, Masayuki Abe · Designs Codes and Cryptography · 2022
Abstract In this paper, we analyze the security of subset-resilient hash function families, which is first proposed as a requirement of a hash-based signature scheme called HORS. Let $${\mathcal {H}}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>H</mml:mi> </mml:math> be a family of functions mapping an element to a subset of size at most k . ( r , k )-subset resilience guarantees that given a random function H from $${\mathcal {H}}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>H</mml:mi> </mml:math> , it is hard to find an $$(r+1)$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:mi>r</mml:mi> <mml:mo>+</mml:mo> <mml:mn>1</mml:mn> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> -tuple $$(x,x_1,\ldots ,x_r)$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:mi>x</mml:mi> <mml:mo>,</mml:mo> <mml:msub> <mml:mi>x</mml:mi> <mml:mn>1</mml:mn> </mml:msub> <mml:mo>,</mml:mo> <mml:mo>…</mml:mo> <mml:mo>,</mml:mo> <mml:msub> <mml:mi>x</mml:mi> <mml:mi>r</mml:mi> </mml:msub> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> such that (1) H ( x ) is covered by the union of $$H(x_i)$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>H</mml:mi> <mml:mo>(</mml:mo> <mml:msub> <mml:mi>x</mml:mi> <mml:mi>i</mml:mi> </mml:msub> <mml:mo>)</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> and (2) x is not equal to any $$x_i$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:msub> <mml:mi>x</mml:mi> <mml:mi>i</mml:mi> </mml:msub> </mml:math> . Subset resilience and its variants are related to nearly all existing stateless hash-based signature schemes, but the power of this security notion is lacking in research. We present three results on subset resilience. First, we show a generic quantum attack against subset resilience, whose time complexity is smaller than simply implementing Grover’s search. Second, we show that subset-resilient hash function families imply the existence of distributional collision-resistant hash function families. Informally, distributional collision resistance is a relaxation of collision resistance, which guarantees that it is hard to find a uniform collision for a hash function. This result implies a comparison among the power of subset resilience, collision resistance, and distributional collision resistance. Third, we prove the fully black-box separation from one-way permutations.
Cited by 3Open access
Amine Zellagui, Naïma Hadj-Said, Adda Ali‐Pacha · Malaysian Journal of Computing and Applied Mathematics · 2020
Secure hash functions play a fundamental role in cryptographic and web applications. They are mainly used, in the context of digital signatures, to verify the integrity and authenticity of information, in recent years research have found weaknesses in a number of hash functions like MD4,MD5 and SHA-1 ,So in this paper a modified scheme of MD4 was proposed by replacing the original message index K and bit rotation S with new sequence using Henon chaos systems , this proposed scheme given high sensibility of any little change to the original message ,great statistical diffusion and confusion performance, high resistance to collision.
Cited by 1Open access
Zongyue Wang, Hongbo Yu, Xiaoyun Wang · Information Processing Letters · 2014
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McKemmie, Eilidh, Srivastava, Amol · arXiv (Cornell University) · 2025
In 1991, Zémor proposed a hash function which provides data security using the difficulty of writing a given matrix as a product of generator matrices. Tillich and Zémor subsequently provided an algorithm finding short collisions for this hash function. We extend this collision attack to a stronger preimage attack, under the assumption that we can factor large integers efficiently. The Euclidean algorithm will factor a $2\times 2$ matrix with non-negative integer entries and determinant $1$. This factorization is short if the matrix entries are all roughly the same size. Therefore, to factor a matrix we need only find an integer matrix with the listed properties which is congruent to the target matrix modulo $p$; finding such an integer matrix is equivalent to solving a Diophantine equation. We give an algorithm to solve this equation.
Cited by 0Open access