Ariel Soto · 2019
Compute the certainty equivalents and premium risks as tools for risk-efficiency analysis. For more technical information, please refer to: Hardaker, Richardson, Lien, & Schumann (2004) <<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-8489.2004.00239.x" target="_top">doi:10.1111/j.1467-8489.2004.00239.x</a>>, and Richardson, & Outlaw (2008) <<a href="https://doi.org/10.2495%2FRISK080231" target="_top">doi:10.2495/RISK080231</a>>.
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Смородинський, Віктор · The Scientific Issues of Ternopil Volodymyr Hnatiuk National Pedagogical University Series pedagogy · 2025
Legal certainty is considered in the paper not only as one of the general principles of law and one of the requirements of the Rule of Law, but also as a fundamental feature and condition of the significance of law and its instrumental value in general. In this regard, the definitions of the Rule of Law conception and the lists of its components proposed by Western philosophers and theorists of law and by the Venice Commission are analyzed. Elements of the principle of legal certainty such as legislation and case law accessibility, legal acts’ predictability, principles of case law unity, legitimate expectations, res judicata, the European concept of autonomous interpretation and the American doctrine of uncertainty of law are covered. By analyzing and synthesizing theoretical concepts of the principle of legal certainty, the practice of its interpretation and application by European and national courts, the connections between it and other general principles of law (in particular – principles of legality and reasonableness), this principle plays a key role in the Rule of Law implementation in the national legal system.
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Daniel Farias Marinho do Monte · LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) · 2018
In an impermanent world, is anything fixed? Could we point at the landscape and proudly declare, like Russell, "The grass is green"? In Über Gewißheit (On Certainty), Wittgenstein develops G. E. Moore's disconcertingly direct objection to the immaterialist skeptical doubt, concluding that the grass is indeed green, though not in the expected sense. Something is fixed, but not the reality pinpointed by Russell and Moore; rather, it is the conditions of our language games, and thus of doubt itself. Our thesis is a logical reconstruction of the conception of certainty investigated by Wittgenstein and inspired by Moore. Our central negative dispute is the rejection of the normative conception of certainty, proposed in Über Gewißheit and widely adopted in the exegetical literature; the positive one is a reconstruction of certainty as a new form of analyticity, dual to Moore's paradox or, broadly speaking, as the logical limit of the conceivable. In particular, we will argue that the grammatical conception of certainty is circular because it bases language games on a language game; and inconsistent, for taking certainties as unequivocal rules, a contradiction in terms. We also contest the very concept of unequivocity, which we have shown to be logical necessity “in disguise”. This suggests that a logicist resumption is a rather consistent development of the language model in Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), if we recognize that the possibility of a language game is conditioned by certain facts. Thus, we outline a logical view of certainty, inspired by Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in which certainties are analytical presuppositions, and the domain of bipolarity includes propositions and rules, given the mutual dependence between doubt and equivocity. Finally, we apply these results to some established topics of the epistemological debate. In particular: we show that the normative vision of certainty conflicts with its externality, which we outline in a reliabilist key; whereas the grammatical or normative approach fails as an antiskeptical argument, but a more satisfying objection is possible, taking certainty under a logical key; finally, we argue that such a logical reading is also a more appropriate objection to Methodist challenges to the foundational status of certainty, and to those that aim at its coherentist aspect, such as the input problem.
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Nathan Andersen · Idealistic Studies · 2010
Commentators on the Phenomenology of Spirit have offered careful but conflicting accounts of Hegel's chapter on sense-certainty, either defending his starting point and analysis or challenging it on its own terms for presupposing too much. Much of the disagreement regarding both the subject matter and success of Hegel's chapter on sense-certainty can be traced to misunderstandings regarding the nature and role of itself in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Specifically, such confusions can be traced to a failure to appreciate the connection between sense-certainty as a particular way of approaching and knowing the world, and the assumptions regarding the nature of the world it comes to know that Hegel attributes to sense-certainty. The certainty of sense-certainty is not so much an explicit attitude or conception it adopts but is rather something implicit in its practice of knowing through immediate or direct sensation.
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Elizabeth Potter · International Studies in Philosophy · 1985
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Abigail Hagar · Bulletin of Miscellaneous Information (Royal Gardens Kew)
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David kauer · Bulletin of Miscellaneous Information (Royal Gardens Kew)
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Michael Homolka · The Open Repository - Binghamton (Binghamton University) · 2008
page 131
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Lesley Murdin · 2020
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Zimmermann, Jan · Homo Politicus (Academy of Humanities and Economics in Lodz) · 2012
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Moon, Andrew · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 2025
This overview of the philosophy of certainty will distinguish two types of certainty, specify controversial theses about certainty from recent literature, and explain some of the arguments for and against those theses.
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Denis Diderot (biography), Philip Stewart · The Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association
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Alan R. White · Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · 1972
Certainty Get access Alan R. White Alan R. White Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 46, Issue 1, 9 July 1972, Pages 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/46.1.1 Published: 30 July 2015
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2018
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Palgrave Macmillan eBooks · 2015
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Rosmini, Antonio 1797-1855 · 1991
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Robin Durnford · McGill-Queen's University Press eBooks · 2012
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Moon, Andrew · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 2025
This overview of the philosophy of certainty will distinguish two types of certainty, specify controversial theses about certainty from recent literature, and explain some of the arguments for and against those theses.
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Bernard Lonergan · The Modern Schoolman · 1950
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Sam Wren-Lewis · 2019
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