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About 1,173 papers for “Collision attack”

Group collision attack

Changhai Ou, Zhu Wang, Degang Sun et al. · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · 2018

Key enumeration schemes are used to post-process the scores given by side channel distinguishers and enumerate the key candidates from the most possible one to the least possible one, which can be regarded as optimal tools of key search. However, the application of them is limited by very large key candidate space and computing power consumption. For example, the attacker may spend several weeks or months enumerating the whole 2 <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">45</sup> key candidates. Unlike the former literature that try to propose a more efficient algorithm to process the distinguishers, scores of key candidates directly, we focus on pre-processing and reducing the key candidate space. To achieve this goal, a new divide and conquer strategy named group collision attack (GCA) is proposed in this paper. The GCA works as follows in brief. The key candidates are first divided into groups on which intra-group collision attack is used to remove the impossible key combinations in each group. Then, the inter-group collision attack is performed to further remove the impossible key combinations between groups. Thus, the complexity of key enumeration is reduced significantly. A series of practical experiments are carried out by using our GCA and the experimental results verify its efficiency.

Cited by 6

Stochastic Collision Attack

Nicolas Bruneau, Claude Carlet, Sylvain Guilley et al. · HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe) · 2017

Cited by 2

Collision Attack For MD5?

Tao Xie, Fanbao Liu, Dengguo Feng · 2012

So far, two different 2-block collision differentials, both with 3-bit input differences for MD5, have been found by Wang etc in 2005 and Xie etc in 2008 respectively, and those differentials have been improved later on to generate a collision respectively within around one minute and half an hour on a desktop PC. Are there more collision differentials for MD5? Can a more efficient algorithm be developed to find MD5 collisions? In this paper, we list the whole set of 1-bit to 3-bit input difference patterns

Cited by 0

Collision Attack on Boole

Florian Mendel, Tomislav Nad, Martin Schläffer · Lecture notes in computer science · 2009

Cited by 6Open access

Improved Collision Attack on OCB

John Erik Mathiassen, John Erik Mathiassen · 2005

In this paper we present an improvement of the collision attack [1] on the authenticated encryption mode of operation OCB. [1] presents a detection of collision method and a way to use the collision, and it is possible to use the information from a collision to change some blocks of the message unnoticed, if they have a special property. We found a way to use the information from a collision to change any future message in any position, without knowing anything about the plaintexts and the nonces. Once a collision is detected the probability of success of cheating is 1, and this part of the attack can be done by hand calculations. It must also be mentioned that our attack depends on the complexity of the detection of a collision, and this does not violate the security bounds given in [2, 3]. However once a collision is found the attack is simple and devastating. 1

Cited by 0

Related-Key Collision Attack of AES_256

Zhihua Hu, Zhongping Qin · 2010

This paper utilized the arrangement points of AES_256 key, analyzed the difference features of AES_256, and found a method of collision attack. This paper also made use of connection differential features and collision method of AES_256 to analyze the 72 bytes of the initial key of AES_256, with a complexity of 2.

Cited by 2

On a Conditional Collision Attack on

2012

A collision attack on NaSHA-512 was proposed by L. Ji et al. The claimed complexity of the attack is 2192. The proposed attack is realized by using a suitable differential pattern. In this note we show that the correct result that can be inferred from their differential pattern is in fact a conditional one. It can be stated correctly as follows: A collision attack on NaSHA-512 of complexity k = 1, 2,..., 2320 can be performed with an unknown probability of success pk, where 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p2320 ≤ 1. Consequently, the attack proposed by L. Ji et al. can be considered only as a direction how a possible collision attack on NaSHA-512 could be realized. The birthday attack remains the best possible attack on NaSHA-512. 1

Cited by 0

Deep Learning Side-Channel Collision Attack

Marvin Staib, Amir Moradi · IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems · 2023

With the breakthrough of Deep Neural Networks, many fields benefited from its enormously increasing performance. Although there is an increasing trend to utilize Deep Learning (DL) for Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks, previous works made specific assumptions for the attack to work. Especially the concept of template attacks is widely adapted while not much attention was paid to other attack strategies. In this work, we present a new methodology, that is able to exploit side-channel collisions in a black-box setting. In particular, our attack is performed in a non-profiled setting and requires neither a hypothetical power model (or let’s say a many-to-one function) nor details about the underlying implementation. While the existing non-profiled DL attacks utilize training metrics to distinguish the correct key, our attack is more efficient by training a model that can be applied to recover multiple key portions, e.g., bytes. In order to perform our attack on raw traces instead of pre-selected samples, we further introduce a DL-based technique that can localize input-dependent leakages in masked implementations, e.g., the leakages associated to one byte of the cipher state in case of AES. We validated our approach by targeting several publicly available power consumption datasets measured from implementations protected by different masking schemes. As a concrete example, we demonstrate how to successfully recover the key bytes of the ASCAD dataset with only a single trained model in a non-profiled setting.

Cited by 23Open access

Plaintext-based Side-channel Collision Attack

Lichao Wu, Sébastien Tiran, Guilherme Perin et al. · IACR Communications in Cryptology · 2024

Side-channel Collision Attacks (SCCA) is a classical method that exploits information dependency leaked during cryptographic operations. Unlike collision attacks that seek instances where two different inputs to a cryptographic algorithm yield identical outputs, SCCAs specifically target the internal state, where identical outputs are more likely. Although SCCA does not rely on the pre-assumption of the leakage model, it explicitly operates on precise trace segments reflecting the target operation, which is challenging to perform when the leakage measurements are noisy. Besides, its attack performance may vary dramatically, as it relies on selecting a reference byte (and its corresponding leakages) to “collide” other bytes. A poor selection would lead to many bytes unrecoverable. These two facts make its real-world application problematic. This paper addresses these challenges by introducing a novel plaintext-based SCCA. We leverage the bijective relationship between plaintext and secret data, using plaintext as labels to train profiling models to depict leakages from varying operations. By comparing the leakage representations produced by the profiling model instead of the leakage segmentation itself, all secret key differences can be revealed simultaneously without processing leakage traces. Furthermore, we propose a novel error correction scheme to rectify false predictions further. Experimental results show that our approach significantly surpasses the state-of-the-art SCCA in both attack performance and computational complexity (e.g., training time reduced from approximately three hours to five minutes). These findings underscore our method's effectiveness and practicality in real-world attack scenarios.

Cited by 2Open access

Collision Attack Framework on RIPEMD-128

Jingyu Li, Guang Zeng, Yang Yang · 2020

In the last few years, the hash functions are the very common and essential primitives implemented in lots of fields. RIPEMD-128, a member of MD-family hash function, has been found collisions on the full round. In this paper, we further analyze the property about the security against collision attack of RIPEMD-128. The collision attack framework for RIPEMD-128 is proposed in order to provide ideas for other hash functions. The framework consists of three parts namely choosing a message word difference insertion, constructing differential characteristics and collision search phase. Cryptographic techniques including message modification is also introduced to reduce the complexity.

Cited by 1

Collision attack on NaSHA-384/512

Zhimin Li, Hongan Jian, Cunhua Li · 2010

NaSHA is a family of hash functions submitted by Markovski and Mileva, it is accepted as one of the first SHA-3 round candidates. In this paper, we present a collision attack on NaSHA for the output sizes 384-bit and 512-bit. This attack is based on the the weakness in the generate course of the state words, and the fact that the quasigroup operation used in the compression function are determined by partial state words. The time complexity of this attack is about 2 <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">128</sup> with negligible memory. This is currently by far the best known cryptanalysis result on this hash function.

Cited by 2

A Meaningful MD5 Hash Collision Attack

Narayana D. Kashyap · 2006

It is now proved by Wang et al., that MD5 hash is no more secure, after they proposed an attack that would generate two different messages that gives the same MD5 sum. Many conditions need to be satisfied to attain this collision. Vlastimil Klima then proposed a more efficient and faster technique to implement this attack. We use these techniques to first create a collision attack and then use these collisions to implement meaningful collisions by creating two different packages that give identical MD5 hash, but when extracted, each gives out different files with contents specified by the atacker.

Cited by 1

Programmatic SAT for SHA-256 Collision Attack

Alamgir, Al Nahiyan Bin · Scholarship at UWindsor (University of Windsor) · 2024

Cryptographic hash functions play a crucial role in ensuring data security, generating fixed-length hashes from variable-length inputs. The hash function SHA-256 is trusted for data security due to its resilience after over twenty years of intense scrutiny. One of its critical properties is collision resistance, meaning that it is infeasible to find two different inputs with the same hash. Currently, the best SHA-256 collision attacks use differential cryptanalysis to find collisions in simplified versions of SHA-256 that are reduced to have fewer steps, making it feasible to find collisions. In this thesis, we use a satisfiability (SAT) solver as a tool to search for step-reduced SHA-256 collisions, and dynamically guide the solver with the aid of a computer algebra system (CAS) used to detect inconsistencies and deduce information that the solver would otherwise not detect on its own. Our hybrid SAT + CAS solver significantly outperformed a pure SAT approach, enabling us to find collisions in step-reduced SHA-256 with significantly more steps. Using SAT + CAS, we are able to find a 38-step slightly-modified SHA-256 collision first found with a highly sophisticated search tool by Mendel, Nad, and Schlaffer. Conversely, a pure SAT approach could find collisions for no more than 28 steps. However, our work only uses the SAT solver CaDiCaL and its programmatic interface IPASIR-UP.

Cited by 0Open access