Ruiliang Wang (262481), Jie Yan (119530), Wenfu Wang (2224360) · Figshare · 2024
<div><p>Sound ecological and environmental governance systems are critical for promoting green and low-carbon economic transformation and high-quality development. However, financing constraints are major obstacle to the revitalization and transformation of China’s real economy. In this study, we constructed an environmental dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (E-DSGE) model that incorporates two types of environmental expenditure and financing constraints, and discussed their economic and environmental effects. Based on this, we further considered the impacts of financing constraints on policy effects. Firstly, we found that increases in carbon emission reduction subsidies in government expenditure (1) increase total economic output and (2) motivate enterprises to increase emission reduction efforts and reduce pollution intensity and emissions, thereby reducing the inventory of environmental pollutants while balancing economic benefits and emission reduction. Secondly, increasing the proportion of government special expenditure on environmental protection promote output growth and directly reduces the pollution stock in the environment. However, such policies may also reduce the emission reduction efforts of enterprises, leading to increases in their pollution emissions and intensity. Lastly, the existence of financing constraints is not conducive to the growth of total output but increases the pollution control effect of emission reduction subsidies and pollution prevention expenditure. Application of the E-DSGE model offers new theoretical insight into environmental economics and macroeconomics. Moreover, the results of this study provide a reference for optimizing the structure of fiscal expenditure.</p></div>
Cited by 0Open access
Bruce Hannon, Matthias Rüth · 1994
Cited by 1
Matthias Rüth, Bruce Hannon · 2012
Cited by 0
Guillaume Rocheteau, Randall Wright · Econometrica · 2004
We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first-order welfare losses. Under price taking, the Friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second, and inflation may actually improve welfare. Under posting, the Friedman rule yields the first best, and inflation implies second-order welfare losses.
Cited by 503
Sean Crockett, Stephen E. Spear, Shyam Sunder · Journal of Mathematical Economics · 2006
Cited by 8Open access
Gerhard Sorger · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2018
Focusing on deterministic models in discrete time, this concise yet rigorous textbook provides a clear and systematic introduction to the theory and application of dynamic economic models. It guides students through the most popular model structures and solution concepts, from the simplest dynamic economic models through to complex problems of optimal policy design in dynamic general equilibrium frameworks. Chapters feature theorems and practical hints, and seventy-five worked examples highlight the various methods and results that can be applied in dynamic economic models. Notation and formulation is uniform throughout, so students can easily discern the similarities and differences between various model classes. Chapters include more than sixty exercises for students to self-test their analytical skills, and password-protected solutions are available for instructors on the companion website. Assuming no prior knowledge of dynamic economic analysis or dynamic optimization, this textbook is ideal for advanced students in economics.
Cited by 0
Jess Benhabib, Kazuo Nishimura · Journal of Economic Theory · 1985
Cited by 225
Rajnish Mehra · The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics · 2008
In this article we define a recursive competitive equilibrium, provide an example and review the related literature.
Cited by 1Open access
Rajnish Mehra · The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics · 2008
Cited by 0
Donald E. Campbell · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2006
This chapter examines a hidden characteristic problem of great significance: We take an economy-wide perspective and ask if there is a mechanism that will elicit private information about individual preferences and firm production recipes in a way that allows an efficient allocation of private goods and services to be identified and implemented. We assume away all other hidden information problems. In particular, every consumer is assumed to know the quality of every firm's output, every employer knows the abilities of every prospective employee, every lender knows the probability of default of every creditor, and so on. Every manager can be relied on to maximize profit. In fact there is no shirking by anyone.
Cited by 0
Rajnish Mehra · The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics · 2018
In this article we define a recursive competitive equilibrium, provide an example and review the related literature.
Cited by 0Open access
Jorge Dávila, Jan Eeckhout · Journal of Economic Theory · 2007
Cited by 22Open access
Rajnish Mehra · National Bureau of Economic Research · 2006
In this article we define a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium, provide an example and review the related literature. The article is an entry prepared for The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (Palgrave Macmillan: New York).
Cited by 2Open access
Randall Wright, Guillame Rocheteau · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Cited by 0
Guillaume Rocheteau, Randall Wright · Working paper · 2004
We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first-order welfare losses. Under price taking, the Friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second, and inflation may actually improve welfare. Under posting, the Friedman rule yields the first best, and inflation implies second-order welfare losses.
Cited by 23Open access
Rajnish Mehra · The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics · 2008
In this article we define a recursive competitive equilibrium, provide an example and review the related literature.
Cited by 10
Jan Eeckhout, Muhamet Yildiz, Seminar Audiences · 2008
Abstract. We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is determinate and depends only on preferences and endowments. This procedure has therefore important implications for policy applications compared to standard bargaining rules.
Cited by 0
Nishimura, Kazuo · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Cited by 1
Guillaume Rocheteau, All Wright, Guillaume Rocheteau et al. · 2005
Cited by 0
L. Panaccione · 2006
Cited by 0