Culpability
The SAGE Glossary of the Social and Behavioral Sciences · 2009
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About 4,741 papers for “Culpability”
The SAGE Glossary of the Social and Behavioral Sciences · 2009
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Ezequiel Vacchelli · Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG eBooks · 2023
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Sofia Jeppsson · 2024
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Yvette M. Alex‐Assensoh · 2023
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2024
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Sofia Jeppsson · 2024
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Paul H. Robinson, Sarah Robinson · 2022
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Luis Ohman, Adrián P Fantini · PubMed · 2016
One of the central matters in forensic psychiatry is its culpability. Day after day we, the mental health professionals, are subpoenaed in different courts of our country to assess the mental state of a given individual in order to endorse a judge so that he can issue their view pertaining the culpability and the responsibility of accused subjects. Our current National Criminal Code, dating from 1921, in Art. 34 sub 1 holds for culpability a dichotomous model in which an individual is responsible and must be accountable for his behavior or not responsible and in such case must no be held accountable in criminal courts. This dichotomous model often does not permit the correct analysis of the psychopathology making sometimes the psychiatrist to force a conclusion according to this paradigm imposed by Justice. As we all know reality does not reflect itself under discrete categories and notwithstanding this is the written norm, people, thoughts, emotions and behaviors manifest in dimensions where boundaries are not always clear. Hence, we are considering it necessary to give effect to the impulses for the reform of the existing Criminal Code to lead to diminish culpability.
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Phillip Atiba Goff, Matthew Christian Jackson, Brooke A. L. Di Leone et al. · PsycTESTS Dataset · 2014
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Martin Montminy · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · 2018
Abstract I explore the question of when an agent is derivatively , rather than directly , culpable for an undesirable outcome. The undesirable outcome might be a harmful incompetent or unwitting act, or it might be a harmful event. By examining various cases, I develop a sophisticated account of indirect culpability that is neutral about controversies regarding normative ethical issues and the condition on direct culpability.
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Claire Horisk · 2024
Abstract This chapter argues that people who listen to belittling speech sometimes bear moral responsibility for the presence of belittling ideas in the common ground. This explains why people feel guilty when they are part of a conversation that involves slurs and belittling jokes. The chapter distinguishes listening from hearing; listening is intentionally hearing someone and trying to understand what they mean. It defines being part of a conversation as being eligible to take a turn. It argues that when listeners are part of a conversation, they bear joint responsibility for the contents of the common ground. While our culture encourages us to be good listeners, the chapter argues that good listening is not always ethical listening. Good listening, in fact, can contribute to public humiliation.
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Ferzan, Kimberly Kessler · eYLS (Yale Law School) · 2007
There are two competing conceptions of mens rea. The first conception is descriptive. We look to a person's mental state to determine if the mental state element is satisfied. This is a question of fact. Alternatively, there is the normative conception of mens rea. This is the question of whether the defendant is blameworthy. The term, mens rea, or "culpability," can therefore refer to the descriptive usage (did the defendant have the requisite mental state, i.e, purpose or knowledge?) or to the normative usage (is the defendant blameworthy, wicked, indifferent?). The tension between descriptive and normative terminology was first identified by Professor George Fletcher more than thirty years ago. In this essay, I aim to dissolve it. Descriptive terms are culpability's grammar; normative terms are culpability's meaning. I begin with Professor Fletcher's discussion of the conflict between descriptive and normative mens rea in his new work, The Grammar of Criminal Law, and his clear preference for normative terminology. I then turn to analyze the subject of the debate - an agent's culpable choice, and argue that there are several different aspects of that choice. Next, I argue that in assessing culpability, we do not focus upon one aspect; rather, the grammar gives meaning to the whole. Although I contend that descriptive and normative culpability can be reconciled, I claim there is a more unified conception of culpability, which simplifies, but does not distort, how the parts give meaning to the whole. In the final part of this essay, I discuss negligence, which admittedly cannot be explained by my theory. I argue, however, that liability for negligence presents problems within the grammar of criminal law as Professor Fletcher finds it.
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The SAGE Encyclopedia of Criminal Psychology · 2019
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Oxford University Press eBooks · 2023
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Candeub, Adam · Knowledge Commons (Lakehead University) · 2002
Article published in the ALouisiana Law Review.
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Trenton Sewell · SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025
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Andrew von Hirsch, Nils Jareborg · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 1988
A perpetrator of a crime deserves reduced punishment, we commonly think, when the conduct has been provoked. Why so? An inquiry into provocation might shed light on the theory of culpability – and particularly, on the seldom considered question of extent of culpability.
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Trenton Sewell · Jurisprudence · 2025
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Scott England · SSRN Electronic Journal · 2021
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NIGEL WALKER · Elsevier eBooks · 1966
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