Marko Kovic, Silje Kristiansen · 2016
The gambler's fallacy is the irrational belief that prior outcomes in a series of events affect the probability of a future outcome, even though the events in question are independent and identically distributed. In this paper, we argue that in the standard account of the gambler's fallacy, the gambler's fallacy fallacy can arise: The irrational belief that all beliefs pertaining to the probabilities of sequences of outcomes constitute the gambler's fallacy, when, in fact, they do not. Specifically, the odds of the probabilities of some sequences of outcomes can be epistemically rational in a given decision-making situation. Not only are such odds of probabilities of sequences of outcomes not the gambler's fallacy, but they can be implemented as a simple heuristic for avoiding the gambler's fallacy in risk-related decision-making. However, we have to be careful not to fall prey to a variant of the gambler's fallacy, the gambler's fallacy fallacy (fallacy), in which we do not calculate odds for the probabilities of sequences that matter, but rather simply believe that the raw probability for the occurrence of a sequence of outcomes is the probability for the last outcome in that sequence.
Cited by 1Open access
Marko Kovic, Silje Kristiansen · Journal of Risk Research · 2017
The gambler’s fallacy is the irrational belief that prior outcomes in a series of events affect the probability of a future outcome, even though the events in question are independent and identically distributed. In this paper, we argue that in the standard account of the gambler’s fallacy, the gambler’s fallacy fallacy can arise: the irrational belief that all beliefs pertaining to the probabilities of sequences of outcomes constitute the gambler’s fallacy, when, in fact, they do not. Specifically, the odds of the probabilities of some sequences of outcomes can be epistemically rational in a given decision-making situation. Not only are such odds of probabilities of sequences of outcomes not the gambler’s fallacy, but they can be implemented as a simple heuristic for avoiding the gambler’s fallacy in risk-related decision-making. However, we have to be careful not to fall prey to a variant of the gambler’s fallacy, the gambler’s fallacy fallacy (fallacy), in which we do not calculate odds for the probabilities of sequences that matter, but rather simply believe that the raw probability for the occurrence of a sequence of outcomes is the probability for the last outcome in that sequence.
Cited by 15
Silje Kristiansen, Marko Kovic · OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) · 2017
The gambler's fallacy is the irrational belief that prior outcomes in a series of events affect the probability of a future outcome, even though the events in question are independent and identically distributed. In this paper, we argue that in the standard account of the gambler's fallacy, the gambler's fallacy fallacy can arise: The irrational belief that all beliefs pertaining to the probabilities of sequences of outcomes constitute the gambler's fallacy, when, in fact, they do not. Specifically, the odds of the probabilities of some sequences of outcomes can be epistemically rational in a given decision-making situation. Not only are such odds of probabilities of sequences of outcomes not the gambler's fallacy, but they can be implemented as a simple heuristic for avoiding the gambler's fallacy in risk-related decision-making. However, we have to be careful not to fall prey to a variant of the gambler's fallacy, the gambler's fallacy fallacy (fallacy), in which we do not calculate odds for the probabilities of sequences that matter, but rather simply believe that the raw probability for the occurrence of a sequence of outcomes is the probability for the last outcome in that sequence.
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Samuel C. Rickless · Noûs · 2005
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Catherine Hundleby · Scholarship at UWindsor (University of Windsor) · 2009
I will situate the fallacies approach to reasoning with the aim of making it more relevant to contemporary life and thus intellectually significant and valuable as a method for teaching reasoning. This entails a revision that will relegate some of the traditional fallacies to the realm of history and introduce more recently recognized problems in reasoning. Some newly recognized problems that demand attention are revealed by contemporary science studies, which reveal at least two tenacious problems in reasoning that I will explore in this paper. One of these problems is androcentrism, a ubiquitous problem with reasoning that feminists exposed in the twentieth century but that continues to pervade peopleâs reasoning. The other is biological reductionism in at least two specific forms: genetic determinism and adaptationism.
Cited by 4Open access
James Jasinski · Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in Contemporary Rhetorical Studies · 2001
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Health-exposure Modelling, The Ecological, Jon Wakefield et al. · 2015
Recently there has been increased interest in modelling the association between aggregate dis-ease counts and environmental exposures measured, for example via air pollution monitors, at point locations. This paper has two aims: first we develop a model for such data in order to avoid ecological bias; second we illustrate that modelling the exposure surface and estimating exposures may lead to bias in estimation of health effects. Design issues are also briefly con-sidered, in particular the loss of information in moving from individual to ecological data, and the at-risk populations to consider in relation to the pollution monitor locations. The approach is investigated initially through simulations, and is then applied to a study of the association between mortality in the over 65’s in the year 2000, and the previous year’s SO2, in London. We conclude that the use of the proposed model can provide valid inference, but the use of estimated exposures should be carried out with great caution.
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2023
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attila · Bulletin of Miscellaneous Information (Royal Gardens Kew)
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Jon Wakefield, Gavin Shaddick, Health-exposure Modelling et al. · 2005
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Attila · Bulletin of Miscellaneous Information (Royal Gardens Kew)
demo / lp released by attila. i would consider this a demo but on their myspace they consider it a full length. pretty sick
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Goldstein, Laurence · Riviste UNIMI (Università degli studi di Milano) · 2008
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Teresa Hołówka · 2024
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Jonathan Howard · 2018
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James P. Downey · Philosophy and literature · 2007
A Fallacy in the Intentional Fallacy James Downey According to a famous argument by W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, the intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard by which to judge the success of a work of literary art. I wish to focus on the former allegation. The author's intention is not available as a standard by which to judge a work's success, it is argued, because "If the poet succeeded in doing it [the intention], then the poem itself shows what he was trying to do. And if the poet did not succeed, then the poem is not adequate evidence, and the critic must go outside the poem."1 The intent of this reasoning is not entirely clear. It is intended to pose a dilemma for intentionalism, but what is the dilemma supposed to be? What difficulty is there for intentionalism if the poem itself shows what the author's intention was? Perhaps it is supposed to follow that somehow intentionalism would be purposeless. Perhaps the point is Socratic: if the intention is successful, then the reader automatically knows it was intended, so that the intention cannot be sought. Or, perhaps it is the success which cannot be sought. The idea may be that one automatically knows the extent of success precisely to the extent that one recognizes the intention. Perhaps both points are intended. On the other side of the dilemma, suppose the intention is not successful and the critic "must go outside the poem." Is this supposed to imply that whatever meaning is thereby discovered will not be the poem's meaning? Or, is the idea that being forced to go outside the poem for evidence of its meaning violates some essential goal of intentionalism? [End Page 149] It is not my main concern, however, to question the implications of the argument's premises. I wish to challenge the basic premise, itself, that if an intention is successful then the work would show that it was the author's intention. I will assume that this means, at least, that the reader would understand a certain intention and know that it was the author's intention, and that the work would provide this knowledge. Sometimes an author deliberately composes without thematic intentions. I take my example from cinematic art because it is a particularly striking example, and the point clearly holds for other forms of art. Furthermore, the intentional fallacy is usually thought to apply to other forms of art in addition to literary art. So, let us consider the method which Salvador Dalí claims that he and Luis Buñuel used when creating Un Chien Andalou, to put together whatever images came to their mind without any particular intentions directing them. Indeed, Dalí claimed, if there was even a pause between the artists, a mere moment when it seemed as though some directed thought might be beginning to take hold of them, he and Buñuel immediately discarded that idea. They retained only those ideas which arose with no thematic intentions, or intentions as to larger meaning. (We may set aside the fact that there were still formal intentions, such as what images to present, in what order, etc.—although even this can be eliminated to some degree, as when an artist cuts up bits of sound tapes and splices them together willy-nilly, and so forth.) In such a work of art, it is not possible that any such intentions be shown, since there are none. But there is still a definite intention behind such art, namely, the intention to compose with no thematic intentions. This intention could be successfully shown to an audience through a work, certainly. However, Dalís often intend otherwise (so they say). They may intend not to reveal whether or not there are certain, or even any, thematic intentions (perhaps that is an intentional anti-religious theme in that scene in Un Chien Andalou, after all; we do not know.) Perhaps, even, Dalí does not want us to know whether he wants us not to know. An intention not to reveal might apply to the intention not to reveal. What a grand game...
Cited by 3
Tiago Cabral · Revista PHILIA | Filosofia Literatura & Arte · 2025
Members of New Criticism, an American school of criticism that predominated in the decades of 1940 and 1950, coined the intentional and the affective fallacies, which essentially dictated the intentions of an author are irrelevant to the meaning of a literary text. To refute this principle, I discuss William’ Shakespeare’s comedy The Merchant of Venice. In the play, Shylock is the antagonist, the comic villain, which is a key feature of the intended meaning of the play. In this article, I purport to show how this anti-aesthetic principle from New Criticism contributes little for literary criticism.
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Maxwell J. D. Ramstead, Dalton A R Sakthivadivel, Karl Friston · arXiv (Cornell University) · 2022
This paper presents a meta-theory of the usage of the free energy principle (FEP) and examines its scope in the modelling of physical systems. We consider the so-called `map-territory fallacy' and the fallacious reification of model properties. By showing that the FEP is a consistent, physics-inspired theory of inferences of inferences, we disprove the assertion that the map-territory fallacy contradicts the principled usage of the FEP. As such, we argue that deploying the map-territory fallacy to criticise the use of the FEP and Bayesian mechanics itself constitutes a fallacy: what we call the {\it map-territory fallacy fallacy}. In so doing, we emphasise a few key points: the uniqueness of the FEP as a model of particles or agents that model their environments; the restoration of convention to the FEP via its relation to the principle of constrained maximum entropy; the `Jaynes optimality' of the FEP under this relation; and finally, the way that this meta-theoretical approach to the FEP clarifies its utility and scope as a formal modelling tool. Taken together, these features make the FEP, uniquely, {\it the} ideal model of generic systems in statistical physics.
Cited by 6Open access
Carrie Figdor · Belgrade Philosophical Annual · 2018
A leading theoretical framework for naturalistic explanation of mind holds that we explain the mind by positing progressively 'stupider' capacities ('homunculi') until the mind is 'discharged' by means of capacities that are not intelligent at all. The so-called homuncular fallacy involves violating this procedure by positing the same capacities at sub-personal levels. I argue that the homuncular fallacy is not a fallacy, and that modern-day homunculi are idle posits. I propose an alternative view of what naturalism requires that reflects how the cognitive sciences are actually integrating mind and matter.
Cited by 4Open access
Boettiger, Carl · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · 2017
Code associated with paper on the Prosecutor's Fallacy in early warning systems, https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.2085. Also extended to cover cases discussed in follow up publication: https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.1372
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Joel Marks · Metaphilosophy · 1988
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