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About 10,000 papers for “Generality”
Michael Potter · Oxford University Press eBooks · 2008
Abstract This chapter focuses on Wittgenstein's account of quantification. Topics covered include variables as classes of propositions, Wittgenstein's idea of decomposing a notation, and the mechanical undecidability of first-order logic.
Cited by 0
Kurbis, N · UCL Discovery (University College London) · 2022
Cited by 0
Salmon, Nathan · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 2012
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Kürbis, Nils · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 2022
Hossack's 'The Metaphysics of Knowledge' develops a theory of facts, entities in which universals are combined with universals or particulars, as the foundation of his metaphysics. While Hossack argues at length that there must be negative facts, facts in which the universal 'negation' is combined with universals or particulars, his conclusion that there are also general facts, facts in which the universal 'generality' is combined with universals, is reached rather more swiftly. In this paper I present Hossack with three arguments for his conclusion. They all draw, as does Hossack's theory of facts, on views Russell expressed in various writings. Two arguments are based on Russell's explanation of universals as aspects of resemblance; the third on Russell's observation that general propositions do not follow logically from exclusively particular premises. Comparison with other metaphysics of generality show them to be wanting and Russell's and Hossack's accounts superior.
Cited by 0
Kürbis, Nils · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 2022
Hossack's 'The Metaphysics of Knowledge' develops a theory of facts, entities in which universals are combined with universals or particulars, as the foundation of his metaphysics. While Hossack argues at length that there must be negative facts, facts in which the universal 'negation' is combined with universals or particulars, his conclusion that there are also general facts, facts in which the universal 'generality' is combined with universals, is reached rather more swiftly. In this paper I present Hossack with three arguments for his conclusion. They all draw, as does Hossack's theory of facts, on views Russell expressed in various writings. Two arguments are based on Russell's explanation of universals as aspects of resemblance; the third on Russell's observation that general propositions do not follow logically from exclusively particular premises. Comparison with other metaphysics of generality show them to be wanting and Russell's and Hossack's accounts superior.
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2013
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Salmon, Nathan · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 2012
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Nils Kürbis · 2022
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Diego Fernandez Slezak (4907260), Mariano Sigman (4629), Guillermo A. Cecchi (125261) · Figshare · 2018
<p>Model extension to on-line buying decision-making. Dots show response times between clicks of users doing a product search, i.e. how long users take to decide for (more information of) a products; blue line shows best RT fit of model showing an almost perfect match (Kolmogorov-Smirnoff Test, <i>D</i><sub><i>n</i></sub> < 10<sup>−8</sup>, <i>p</i> > 0.99).</p>
Cited by 0Open access
Phyllis Chiasson · 2001
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Øystein Linnebo · The Journal of Philosophy · 2022
What explains the truth of a universal generalization? Two types of explanation can be distinguished. While an ‘instance-based explanation’ proceeds via some or all instances of the generalization, a ‘generic explanation’ is independent of the instances, relying instead on completely general facts about the properties or operations involved in the generalization. This intuitive distinction is analyzed by means of a truthmaker semantics, which also sheds light on the correct logic of quantification. On the most natural version of the semantics, this analysis vindicates some claims made—without a proper defense—by Michael Dummett, Solomon Feferman, and others. Where instance-based explanations are freely available, classical logic is shown to be warranted. By contrast, intuitionistic logic (or slightly more) remains warranted regardless of what explanations are available.
Cited by 11Open access
Fabiano, Edward · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · 2025
This paper introduces the Generality Theory, a framework aiming to unify all forces of nature through a total action that connects Relativity, quantum generalizations, and black hole principles. The theory introduces the Edwardian factor, a dimensionless entropic correction acting at both micro and macro scales. This modification adjusts Einstein’s field equations and provides a novel approach to the integration of gravitation, quantum mechanics, and cosmology.
Cited by 0Open access
Fabiano, Edward · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · 2025
This paper introduces the Generality Theory, a framework aiming to unify all forces of nature through a total action that connects Relativity, quantum generalizations, and black hole principles. The theory introduces the Edwardian factor, a dimensionless entropic correction acting at both micro and macro scales. This modification adjusts Einstein’s field equations and provides a novel approach to the integration of gravitation, quantum mechanics, and cosmology.
Cited by 0Open access
Gustav Bergmann · Theoria · 1962
Cited by 3
Ragav Venkatesan, Vijetha Gattupalli, Baoxin Li · arXiv (Cornell University) · 2016
Often the filters learned by Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) from different datasets appear similar. This is prominent in the first few layers. This similarity of filters is being exploited for the purposes of transfer learning and some studies have been made to analyse such transferability of features. This is also being used as an initialization technique for different tasks in the same dataset or for the same task in similar datasets. Off-the-shelf CNN features have capitalized on this idea to promote their networks as best transferable and most general and are used in a cavalier manner in day-to-day computer vision tasks. It is curious that while the filters learned by these CNNs are related to the atomic structures of the images from which they are learnt, all datasets learn similar looking low-level filters. With the understanding that a dataset that contains many such atomic structures learn general filters and are therefore useful to initialize other networks with, we propose a way to analyse and quantify generality among datasets from their accuracies on transferred filters. We applied this metric on several popular character recognition, natural image and a medical image dataset, and arrived at some interesting conclusions. On further experimentation we also discovered that particular classes in a dataset themselves are more general than others.
Cited by 1Open access
Giovanni Battista Ratti · CINECA IRIS Institutial Research Information System (University of Genoa) · 2025
In this essay, I address the notions of generalization used in Fred Schauer’s works on this topic, and I also address the layers of generalizations that exist in the legal field. In the last part of the essay, I briefly discuss, mainly with examples, some criteria by which we can determine whether we are dealing with reliable or unreliable generalizations.
Cited by 0
Sebastian Rödl · Philosophical Topics · 2014
The essay argues that there is no such thing as the epistemology of testimony as it is currently conceived: a subfield of epistemology that concerns itself with a special form of acquiring knowledge, a special kind of justification, a special sort of reason for belief. Rather, the concept of knowledge contains an account of the possibility of knowing from others. We cannot find ourselves in this predicament: we comprehend what knowledge is all right, and yet have difficulty seeing how one may, from the words of another, come to acquire that: knowledge. And if we cannot find ourselves in this predicament, then there can be no need to introduce, in response to it, concepts that currently attract much interest—trust, authority, sincerity, etc.
Cited by 10
Andrea Giananti · Theoria · 2020
Abstract How does perceptual experience disclose the world to us? According to the content view (CV), visual perceptual consciousness entails representational content. According to pure relationalism , perception is a non‐representational relation between a subject and an object. In this article, I argue that CV‐theorists are implicitly committed to the claim that there is an element of generality in perception, and I show how pure relationalists would emphasize the particularity of perception, instead of its generality. But I also argue that there are good epistemological and phenomenological reasons for thinking that there is generality in perception. In particular, I focus on Brewer's purely relationalist account and I argue that it either fails to satisfy important phenomenological and epistemological requirements, or it introduces generality in a way that makes it collapse into CV. I contend that construing the debate between CV and pure relationalism in light of particularity and generality advances our understanding of how perceptual experience discloses the world to us, as well as strengthening the standing of CV.
Cited by 2Open access
George W. Ernst, Allen Newell · Open MIND · 1990
Computer Science Department
Cited by 0
Frederick Schauer · Law and Philosophy · 1997
This DOI is not currently attached to any metadata records. DOIs can’t actually ever be deleted (they’re persistent), but sometimes our members create DOIs in error. We do have a process to approximate deletion which we follow only in rare cases where the DOI has been genuinely created in error, and most crucially, if the DOI has never been published anywhere online or in print and never otherwise distributed to or communicated with anyone (authors, readers, reviewers, etc.
Cited by 0Open access