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About 7,650 papers for “Logical security”

Logical Foundations of Computer Security

Bob Constable · 2015

The first of my four lectures on the logical foundations of computer security will establish the ma-thematical setting in which we will work, namely computational type theory. In this setting we can pursue algorithmic ideas from their natural expression in computer science articles to their codifi-cation in executable systems and finally to their incorporation into formal arguments that a system achieves some stated purpose. For this lecture we draw on material produced in previous summer school lectures, in particular on the booklet Naive Computational Type Theory from Marktoberdorf 2001. Another modern source of this material is the recent monograph by M. Sorensen and P. Ur-zyczyn, see [7]. The Nuprl version of computational type theory is presented in the article by Allen, Bickford et. al, see [2]. The second lecture will present an abstract theory of events which my colleague Mark Bickford and I created in 2003 for specifying distributed computing problems. This theory has been implemented in the Nuprl version of Computational Type Theory (CTT) by Mark. The theory is based on the causal order relation used by Leslie Lamport in this early work on the foundations of distributed computing. One good reference for this material are the MOD05 lectures notes by Mark Bickford and me, see [4]. The material was also presented in the introduction to the paper [5].

Cited by 0

Audit of Logical Security Controls

Alzate Mejia, Nestor, CANO BELTRAN, JHON HAIDE · Mendeley Data · 2025

Logical controls encompass user authentication, authorization, session management, segregation of duties (SoD), and log monitoring capabilities. Weaknesses in these areas expose payroll data to unauthorized changes, privilege abuse, and potential fraud. Students will operate in a controlled environment emulating FinGroup’s production payroll system. They will extract user entitlement listings, correlate them with HR records to detect orphan accounts or over-provisioned users, and test SoD conflicts such as users having both payroll data entry and approval rights. System logs will be collected, parsed, and analyzed to identify suspicious patterns (e.g., after-hours logins, repeated failed authentications, privilege escalations). The ultimate goal is to validate whether FinGroup’s logical access management processes comply with governance frameworks like COBIT DSS05 and ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A.9 (Access Control), and to generate actionable remediation recommendations.

Cited by 0Open access

Logical Methods in Security and Privacy

Anupam Datta · IEEE Security & Privacy · 2010

Computer security and privacy is concerned with the design, implementation, and analysis of mechanisms intended to guarantee that desired policies (or properties) hold in the presence of malicious adversaries. In this article some logical methods for reasoning about system security and for enforcing security and privacy policies are discussed.

Cited by 1

Distributed System Security via Logical Frameworks (SeLF)

Lujo Bauer, Frank Pfenning, Michael K. Reiter et al. · 2008

Abstract : We conducted a research program with the goal of advancing security in distributed systems via the application of logical frameworks. Our work targeted multiple facets of the life-cycle of a distributed system, ranging from design through execution, and from sound mechanism design through sound policy enforcement. It consisted of three major interconnected thrusts. First, we investigated how to exploit existing technologies to mechanically reason about security policies as specified in a logical framework. This closed an important security gap, helping users and managers understand the consequences of their policies. Second, we demonstrated the use of logical frameworks for encoding and enforcing access-control policies in a practical distributed system. Access-control mechanisms today, whether it be physical keys for doors or password protection for computer accounts, reflect access-control policies that are explicit only in the manual procedures of the organization that manages these resources. As such, any change in policy, e.g., creating a new computer account, or permitting a person to unlock a door, is effected through a manual process. We utilized logical frameworks to encode organizational policies within computer systems, thereby harnessing the power of these frameworks to support the management and enforcement of access-control policy, and gaining security and flexibility by doing so. We demonstrated this capability in a ubiquitous computing test-bed at Carnegie Mellon. Third, we developed and implemented a framework for the specification of distributed and concurrent systems and their implementations, specifically targeting our test-bad architecture. This work extends a previous collaboration between NRL and Carnegie Mellon that resulted in the design of CLF, an innovative logical language for the specification of concurrent systems. CLF incorporates ideas from logical frameworks, linear logic, and monads into an expressive meta-language.

Cited by 0

Design and Logical Analysis of Security Protocols

Qing Si · 2003

With the rapid growth of network applications, network security has become an important issue. In this paper, the following issues are investigated: the design principles of security protocols, the use of formal methods in the design of security protocols, the characteristics of various approaches to formal analysis, in particular logical analysis. The strand space approach to logical analysis, and the possibility of the strand space model guiding the formal design of security protocols are also explored.

Cited by 11

Security risk prioritization for logical attack graphs

Hussain M. J. Almohri · K-State Research Exchange (Kansas State University) · 2008

To prevent large networks from potential security threats, network administrators need to know in advance what components of their networks are under high security risk.One way to obtain this knowledge is via attack graphs.Various types of attack graphs based on miscellaneous techniques has been proposed [1][2][3][4][5].However, attack graphs can only make assertion about different paths that an attacker can take to compromise the network.This information is just half the solution in securing a particular network.Network administrators need to analyze an attack graph to be able to identify the associated risk.Provided that attack graphs can get very large in size, it would be very difficult for them to perform the task.In this thesis, I provide a security risk prioritization algorithm to rank logical attack graphs produced by MulVAL (A vulnerability analysis system) [6].My proposed method (called StepRank) is based on a previously published algorithm called AssetRank [7] that generalizes over Google's PageRank [8] algorithm.StepRank considers a forward attack graph that is a reversed version of the original MulVAL attack graph used by AssetRank.The result of the ranking algorithm is a rank value for each node that is relative to every other rank value and shows how difficult it is for an attacker to satisfy a node.

Cited by 0Open access

Network Management M4 Security Requirements and Logical MIB

The ATM Forum · 1999

this document or its contents does not in any way create by implication or otherwise: . Any express or implied license or right to or under any ATM Forum member company's patent, copyright, trademark or trade secret rights which are or may be associated with the ideas, techniques, concepts or expressions contained herein; nor . Any warranty or representation that any ATM Forum member companies will announce any product(s) and/or service(s) related thereto, or if such announcements are made, that such announced product(s) and/or service(s) embody any or all of the ideas, technologies, or concepts contained herein; nor . Any form of relationship between any ATM Forum member companies and the recipient or user of this document. Implementation or use of specific ATM standards or recommendations and ATM Forum specifications will be voluntary, and no company shall agree or be obliged to implement them by virtue of participation in The ATM Forum. The ATM Forum is a non-profit international organization accelerating industry cooperation on ATM technology. The ATM Forum does not, expressly or otherwise, endorse or promote any specific products or services. NOTE: The user's attention is called to the possibility that implementation of the ATM interoperability specification contained herein may require use of an invention covered by patent rights held by ATM Forum Member companies or others. By publication of this ATM interoperability specification, no position is taken by The ATM Forum with respect to validity of any patent claims or of any patent rights related thereto or the ability to obtain the license to use such rights. ATM Forum Member companies agree to grant licenses under the relevant patents they own on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions to applicant...

Cited by 0

Security of cryptographic protocols (logical and computational aspects)

Mathieu Baudet · OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) · 2007

Cette thèse est consacrée au problème de la vérification automatique des protocoles cryptographiques d'un point de vue logique et calculatoire. Dans une première partie, nous abordons la sécurité des protocoles dans le cadre logique (formel). Nous montrons comment spécifier différentes propriétés de sécurité des protocoles (secret, authentification, résistance aux attaques par dictionnaire) au moyen d'un langage de processus et comment les analyser de manière automatique pour un nombre borné de sessions. La seconde partie traite de la justification cryptographique des modèles logiques. Nous nous intéressons ici a la notion d'équivalence statique, appliquée en particulier au chiffrement et aux données vulnérables aux attaques par dictionnaire (par ex. des mots de passe). Dans ce cadre, nous montrons que sous certaines conditions simples, toute preuve logique d'équivalence statique implique d'indistinguibilité cryptographique des données modélisées.

Cited by 0Open access

Continental Borders and National Security: A Logical Diagnosis

José Luis Valdés Ugalde, Bernadette Vega · 2016

To understand the theoretical argument, attention must first rivet on empirical dynamics first how the problem has festered, then on the big policy-making picture at the national level, and finally on how this differs from the smaller, but noisier local-level imprints. A flailing US economy could support neither regional economic integration nor immigration. During Jimmy Carter's presidency, the Special Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP), established by Congress in 1978, became the first to address illegal US immigration. With the mushrooming of the illegal immigration-drug trafficking-money laundering nexus, it becomes increasingly difficult to concentrate on any one specific threat, avoid an escalation in policy responses, and prevent the insulation of the larger society at both ends. The US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), through its 2005 Operation Community Shield, netted over 1,415 members of transnational gangs (Valentin 2006), and, since 2003, deported 52,684 criminal aliens and 40,802 non-criminal aliens.

Cited by 0