This paper defines and analyzes a fully deterministic parallelizable block-cipher mode of operation for message authentication— DPMAC (deterministic parallelizable message authentication code). DPMAC is constructed based on a 128-bit block cipher, works for strings of any bit length, and employs a single block-cipher key. Its security is proved, using the Game-Playing technique to quantify an adversary's forgery probability in terms of the quality of the block cipher as a pseudo-random permutation.

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Hash-Based Message Authentication Code

Sushil Jajodia, Pierangela Samarati, Moti Yung · 2025

Cited by 0

TCP Message Authentication Code Option

Brian Weis · 2005

This memo describes a TCP [RFC0793] extension to enhance security for BGP [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp4] and other TCP-based protocols requiring message authentication. It provides message authentication using a Message Authentication Code (MAC), which is a superior authentication method to the keyed MD5 method previously used. The option also includes provision for automatic generation and distribution of MAC keys. A set of MAC algorithms are specified, as well as guidance when to use each one.

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Building the Big Message Authentication Code

Dale R. Thompson, J. Brad Maxwell, J.P. Parkerson · 2003

Message Authentication Codes (MAC) are used to ensure the integrity of digital content is not compromised and to authenticate the sender. A MAC can be constructed by using a message digest and a shared secret value. Two different digital contents should have a low probability of having the same message digest. This is called a collision. Also, when a message digest is used to create a MAC, it should be difficult for an adversary to create a collision. A rough calculation demonstrates that a collision could be found for a 128-bit message digest in approximately six hours with a parallel collision attack using a special-purpose machine. A composite message digest is constructed out of existing functions to decrease the probability of collision. Also, the MAC based on the composite message digest is constructed so that it is difficult for an adversary to create a collision.

Cited by 3

The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code

2009

1 Introduction This paper introduces and analyzes Poly1305-AES, a state-of-the-art secret-keymessage-authentication code suitable for a wide variety of applications. Poly1305-AES computes a 16-byte authenticator Poly1305r(m, AESk(n)) ofa variable-length message

Cited by 0

Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC):

Meltem Sönmez Turan · 2025

Cited by 22

PMAC: A Parallelizable Message Authentication Code

Phillip Rogaway · 2000

We describe a MAC (message authentication code) which is deterministic, parallelizable, and uses only ### #### block-cipher invocations to MAC a non-empty string # (where # is the blocksize of the underlying block cipher). The MAC can be proven secure (work to appear) in the reduction-based approach of modern cryptography. The MAC is similar to one recently suggested by Gligor and Donescu [5]. 1 Introduction PMAC and its characteristics This note describes a new message authentication code, ####. Unlike customary modes for message authentication, the construction here is fully parallelizable. This will result in faster authentication in a variety of settings. The #### construction is stingy in its use of block-cipher calls, employing just ### #### block-cipher invocations to MAC a nonempty string # using an #-bit block cipher. A MAC computed by PMAC can have any length from up to # bits. Unlike the CBC MAC (in its basic form), #### can be applied to any message # ; in particula...

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Message authentication code (MAC) validation system

Miles E. Smid, Elaine B. Barker, David Balenson et al. · 1988

X9. 9-1986, Financial Institution Message Authentication (Wholesale). The MVS is designed to perform automated testing on message authentication devices which are remote to NBS. This publication provides brief overviews of the two data authentication stan- dards and introduces the basic design and configuration of the MVS. The requirements and administrative procedures to be followed by those seeking formal NBS validation of a message authentication device are presented. The requirements described include the specific protocols for communication between the message authentication device un- der test (DUT) and the MVS, the types of tests which the DUT must pass for formal NBS validation, and general instructions for accessing and interfacing to the MVS. An appendix with examples illustrating the MVS testing protocol is provided.

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and Message Authentication Code (MAC) Algorithms

2010

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The Poly1305-AES Message-Authentication Code

Daniel J. Bernstein · Lecture notes in computer science · 2005

Cited by 345Open access

Babel Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)

D. Ovsienko, Cryptographic Authentication · 2014

This document describes a cryptographic authentication mechanism for the Babel routing protocol. This document updates RFC 6126. The mechanism allocates two new TLV types for the authentication data, uses Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC), and is both optional and backward compatible. Status of This Memo This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for examination, experimental implementation, and evaluation.

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Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC):

Meltem Sönmez Turan · 2022

Cited by 11

Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code

2007

1.0 29-Oct-2007 Derived from Security Target, no changes 1.1 07-Nov-2007 Updated Reference to new Version of AES User Guidance 1.2 07-Dec-2007 Added P5CD012V0B as new supported hardware configuration Contact information

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Information security with message authentication code

T A Bilyk, A A Vnukov · SHILAP Revista de lepidopterología · 2012

This article describes three Message authentication code algorithms. These algorithms ensure the authenticity of the message between two or more parties to the transaction and can be applied in such information bank systems as CFT and so on. Also the results of testing the software implementation of these algorithms are described here.

Cited by 0Open access