Remanufacturing
Bernard, Sophie · PolyPublie (École Polytechnique de Montréal) · 2009
Cited by 0
Read the abstract, see who wrote it and who cites it, and get the citation in APA, MLA, Chicago or Harvard.
About 5,806 papers for “Remanufacturing”
Bernard, Sophie · PolyPublie (École Polytechnique de Montréal) · 2009
Cited by 0
Sophie Bernard · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase.
Cited by 0
Sophie Bernard · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase.
Cited by 0
N. Nasr, E. Varel, R. Bauer · 1997
Summary form only given as follows. Deterioration of our ecosystem has forced government, consumers and manufacturers to question production methods, products used, and product disposal. It is becoming no longer feasible to make goods without taking into consideration the end of a product's useful life. Remanufacturing as the ultimate form of recycling is a relatively unknown end-of-life process which demands further development. The product life cycle and its impact on the environment are discussed in this paper.
Cited by 11
Sophie Bernard · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase.
Cited by 0
Matsumoto, Mitsutaka, Ijomah, Winifred · Strathprints: The University of Strathclyde institutional repository (University of Strathclyde) · 2013
Cited by 0
Bernard, Sophie · uO Research (University of Ottawa) · 2010
Remanufacturing is a form of recycling where used durable goods are refurbished to a condition comparable to new products. With reduced energy and resource consumption, remanufactured goods are produced at a fraction of the original cost and with lower emissions of pollution. This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produce a component of a final good. The component needing to be replaced creates an aftermarket. An environmental regulation assessing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results indicate that a social planner could use collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability as a substitute for environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. One of the results also coincides with the Porter Hypothesis. / Le remanufacturing est une forme de recyclage où des biens durables usagés sont remis à neuf. Tout en consommant moins d’énergie et de ressource, les biens remanufacturés sont produits à une fraction du coût original et émettent moins de pollution. Ce papier présente un model théorique de remanufacturing où un duopole de manufacturiers originaux produisent un composant d’un bien final. Ce composant devant être changé, un marché secondaire est créé. Une réglementation environnementale déterminant un niveau minimal de remanufacturabilité est introduite au modèle. Les principaux résultats indiquent qu’un planificateur social pourrait substituer la réglementation environnementale par la collusion des firmes sur le niveau de remanufacturabilité. Cependant, lorsqu’une réglementation environnementale est prévue, la collusion devrait être réprimée puisque la compétition s’accorde mieux avec une intervention publique. Un des résultats coïncide aussi avec l’hypothèse de Porter.
Cited by 0Open access
Bernard, Sophie · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase.
Cited by 0
Sophie Bernard · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase.
Cited by 0
Katherine Ortegon, Loring Nies, John W. Sutherland · 2019
Cited by 1
P. M. Swamidass · 2000
Cited by 0
Series on resource management · 2003
Cited by 0
Bernard, Sophie · University of Ottawa - Library · 2010
Remanufacturing is a form of recycling where used durable goods are refurbished to a condition comparable to new products. With reduced energy and resource consumption, remanufactured goods are produced at a fraction of the original cost and with lower emissions of pollution. This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produce a component of a final good. The component needing to be replaced creates an aftermarket. An environmental regulation assessing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results indicate that a social planner could use collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability as a substitute for environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. One of the results also coincides with the Porter Hypothesis. / Le remanufacturing est une forme de recyclage où des biens durables usagés sont remis à neuf. Tout en consommant moins d’énergie et de ressource, les biens remanufacturés sont produits à une fraction du coût original et émettent moins de pollution. Ce papier présente un model théorique de remanufacturing où un duopole de manufacturiers originaux produisent un composant d’un bien final. Ce composant devant être changé, un marché secondaire est créé. Une réglementation environnementale déterminant un niveau minimal de remanufacturabilité est introduite au modèle. Les principaux résultats indiquent qu’un planificateur social pourrait substituer la réglementation environnementale par la collusion des firmes sur le niveau de remanufacturabilité. Cependant, lorsqu’une réglementation environnementale est prévue, la collusion devrait être réprimée puisque la compétition s’accorde mieux avec une intervention publique. Un des résultats coïncide aussi avec l’hypothèse de Porter.
Cited by 0Open access
WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks · 2023
Cited by 0
Steinhilper, R. · Fraunhofer-Publica (Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft) · 1998
Das Buch präsentiert einen umfassenden Überblick über die industrielle Aufarbeitung von Produkten, die von der Kfz-Austauschmotorenfertigung ausgehend viele Anwendungsfelder erobert hat. Die Fertigungsschritte zur Wiederherstellung auf den Neuzustand, von der Demontage über die Bauteilereinigung, Prüfung und Sorting, die Aufarbeitung sowie Wiedermontage der Produkte werden u.a. anhand von Kfz-Baugruppen, Maschinen, Kopierern, Computern und Elektronikprodukten mit Techniktrends und Kosten vorgestellt. Erfolgsfaktoren, Alternativen, Märkte aufgearbeiteter Produkte, neue Arbeitsplätze, neue Geschäftsfeldchancen, Produktentwicklungs- und Sicherheitsaspekte wie auch Umweltschutzbeiträge werden dargestellt und durch 100 farbige Abbildungen im internationalen Maßstab illustriert.
Cited by 0
Bernard, Sophie · PolyPublie (École Polytechnique de Montréal) · 2011
Cited by 0
Bernard, Sophie · HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe) · 2011
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-de-travail/
Cited by 0Open access
Bernard, Sophie · PolyPublie (École Polytechnique de Montréal) · 2009
Cited by 0
Bernard, Sophie · PolyPublie (École Polytechnique de Montréal) · 2010
Cited by 0
Bernard, Sophie · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase.
Cited by 0