J. Schaad, B. Kaliski, R. Housley · 2005
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards " (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document supplements RFC 3279. It describes the conventions for using the RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS) signature algorithm, the RSA Encryption Scheme- Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key transport algorithm and additional one-way hash functions with the Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 version 1.5 signature algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Encoding formats, algorithm identifiers, and
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D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell et al. · 2005
draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-00.txt Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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Jason J. Haas, Yih‐Chun Hu, Kenneth P. Laberteaux · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · 2011
In this paper, we propose a lightweight mechanism for revoking security certificates that is appropriate for the limited bandwidth and hardware cost constraints of a VANET. A Certificate Authority (CA) issues certificates to trusted nodes, i.e., vehicles. If the CA looses trust in a vehicle (e.g., due to evidence of malfunction or malicious behavior), the CA must promptly revoke the certificates of the distrusted vehicle. To distribute revocation information quickly even during incremental deployment, we propose that CAs use Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). The CRL should be composed in a secure manner, and it should be exchanged in a way such that the CRL is both quickly and widely distributed. We previously proposed a mechanism for the quick distribution of CRL updates that also covers a wide area by using vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication . In this paper, we additionally investigate the performance of V2V communication in partial deployment scenarios, that is, where only a certain percentage of vehicles are equipped with VANET radios. We provide simulation results that show our V2V exchange mechanism is quicker than distributing CRLs or CRL updates through road-side units (RSUs) alone. However, this revocation process, which involves both the CA and vehicles, must conform to the aforementioned bandwidth and hardware restrictions. In this paper, we present mechanisms that achieve the goals of reduced CRL size, a computationally efficient mechanism for determining if a certificate is on the CRL, and a lightweight mechanism for exchanging CRL updates. Additionally, we expand on our previous work to provide privacy to revoked vehicles prior to their revocation.
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Harshit Kumar, Dinesh Singh · 2020
Communication among vehicles should be secure and safe. Any vehicle or node that misbehaves or transmits wrong information needs to be revoked. One of the widely used scheme to revoke the malicious node's certificate is a public key infrastructure (PKI). In PKI Certificate revocation list (CRL) is issued by the Certificate Authority (CA). CRL is distributed in the system after its creation by the CA. All the vehicles must receive a genuine copy of CRL so that they can stop receiving messages from malicious nodes. CRL should be distributed very fast and efficiently in the VANET system. We propose a new method for CRL distribution called Smart Certificate Revocation List Exchange (SCRLE). Both V2V and V2I communication is used by our method to distribute CRL pieces among the vehicles. Our method is inspired by C2CEpidemic method of CRL distribution and uses the idea of sharing the CRL list in peer to peer manner. With this approach, vehicles will be able to find their peers more appropriately. This approach uses a ranking mechanism by which vehicles will be paired with those vehicles which have more number of CRL pieces. This will increase the chance of exchanging of CRL pieces efficiently. OMNET++ along with Vein s framework is used to implement and evaluate the method. Sumo is used to generate traces of vehicles for large scale simulation. Results show that it performs better than C2CEpidemic method of CRL exchange.
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S. Santesson (microsoft · 2006
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than a "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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B. Kaliski (rsa Laboratories · 2002
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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Stensson, Simon · KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology) · 2024
This thesis presents a comprehensive longitudinal analysis and categorization of theusage of certificate revocation lists (CRLs). By utilizing data collected from certificatetransparency logs (CT logs), we examine the trends in CRL usage across various certifi-cate authorities (CAs) and domain categories over the past seven years. Our findings sug-gest significant shifts in CRL practices, highlighting a withdrawal from CRLs until recentyears where the trend has turned. This study provides valuable insights in the landscapeof CRLs and their place in the evolving digital certificates landscape, emphasizing shiftsamong different domain categories as well as among shifts in the attributes of CRLs. Theresults furthermore emphasize the rate of which the certificate authorities move away fromunsafe solutions such as OCSP for revocation methods.
Cited by 0Open access
Nuttapong Attrapadung, Keita Emura, Goichiro Hanaoka et al. · The Computer Journal · 2015
It is essential that a multi-user cryptographic primitive be revocable since a legitimate user may quit the organization, or may act on malicious intent, or the relevant key may be leaked. In the group signature context, usually the group manager publishes the revocation list that contains revocation tokens. Since signers/verifiers need to obtain the revocation list in each revocation epoch to generate/verify a group signature, a small-size revocation list is really important in practice. However, all previous revocable group signatures require at least an |$O(r)$|-size revocation list, where |$r$| is the number of revoked users. In this paper, we propose the first revocable group signature scheme with a constant-size revocation list using identity-based revocation (IBR) techniques. We use an IBR scheme proposed by Attrapadung–Libert–Panafieu (PKC 2011) as a building block. As in the Libert–Peters–Yung schemes (EUROCRYPT 2012/CRYPTO 2012), no signing key update is required. In addition, the verification cost does not depend on the number of revoked users |$r$|. Although the maximum number of revoked users needs to be fixed in the setup phase, the maximum number of group members is potentially unbounded as in IBR. This property has not been achieved in the recent scalable revocable group signature schemes and seems to be of independent interest.
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Nuttapong Attrapadung, Keita Emura, Goichiro Hanaoka et al. · Lecture notes in computer science · 2014
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Li Duan, Yong Li, Lijun Liao · 2018
When relying on public key infrastructure (PKI) for authentication, whether a party can be trusted primarily depends on its certificate status. Bob's certificate status can be retrieved by Alice through her interaction with Certificate Authority (CA) in the PKI. More specifically, Alice can download Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and then check whether the serial number of the Bob's certificate appears in this list. If not found, Alice knows that Bob can be trusted. Once downloaded, a CRL can be used offline for arbitrary many times till it expires, which saves the bandwidth to an extreme. However, if the number of revoked certificates becomes too large, the size of the CRL will exceed the RAM of Alice's device. This conflict between bandwidth and RAM consumption becomes even more challenging for the Internet-of-Things (IoT), since the IoT end-devices is usually constrained by both factors.
Cited by 14Open access
Nowatkowski, Michael E. · SMARTech Repository (Georgia Institute of Technology) · 2010
The objective of this research is to investigate improved methods for distributing certificate revocation lists (CRLs) in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). VANETs are a subset of mobile ad hoc networks composed of network-equipped vehicles and infrastructure points, which will allow vehicles to communicate with other vehicles and with roadside infrastructure points. While sharing some of the same limitations of mobile ad hoc networks, such as lack of infrastructure and limited communications range, VANETs have several dissimilarities that make them a much different research area. The main differences include the size of the network, the speed of the vehicles, and the network security concerns. Confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and availability are some of the standard goals of network security. While confidentiality and authenticity at times seem in opposition to each other, VANET researchers have developed many methods for enhancing confidentiality while at the same time providing authenticity. The method agreed upon for confidentiality and authenticity by most researchers and the IEEE 1609 working group is a public key infrastructure (PKI) system. An important part of any PKI system is the revocation of certificates. The revocation process, as well as the distribution of revocation information, is an open research problem for VANETs. This research develops new methods of CRL distribution and compares them to existing methods proposed by other researchers. The new methods show improved performance in various vehicle traffic densities.
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Toru Nakanishi, Nobuo Funabiki · Lecture notes in computer science · 2014
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Jerome A. Solinas, L. Zieglar · 2010
This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and
X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use with the United
States National Security Agency's Suite B Cryptography. The reader
is assumed to have familiarity with RFC 5280, X.509 Public
Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile. This document is not an Internet Standards Track
specification; it is published for informational purposes.
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Version May Gatekeeper · 2007
CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................4 1.1 Background ...................................................................................................................4 1.2 Scope.............................................................................................................................4 1.3 References .....................................................................................................................4 1.4 Definitions .....................................................................................................................5 1.5 Acronyms and abbreviations .........................................................................................6 1.6 Conformance .................................................................................................................6 1.7 Document structure .......................................
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Giovanni Rigazzi, Andrea Tassi, Robert J. Piechocki et al. · arXiv (Cornell University) · 2017
The successful deployment of safe and trustworthy Connected and Autonomous\nVehicles (CAVs) will highly depend on the ability to devise robust and\neffective security solutions to resist sophisticated cyber attacks and patch up\ncritical vulnerabilities. Pseudonym Public Key Infrastructure (PPKI) is a\npromising approach to secure vehicular networks as well as ensure data and\nlocation privacy, concealing the vehicles' real identities. Nevertheless,\npseudonym distribution and management affect PPKI scalability due to the\nsignificant number of digital certificates required by a single vehicle. In\nthis paper, we focus on the certificate revocation process and propose a\nversatile and low-complexity framework to facilitate the distribution of the\nCertificate Revocation Lists (CRL) issued by the Certification Authority (CA).\nCRL compression is achieved through optimized Bloom filters, which guarantee a\nconsiderable overhead reduction with a configurable rate of false positives.\nOur results show that the distribution of compressed CRLs can significantly\nenhance the system scalability without increasing the complexity of the\nrevocation process.\n
Cited by 0Open access
Michael Nowatkowski, L. Owen Henry · 2010
In this paper, the primary objective is to discuss the details of scalable methods for distributing certificate revocation lists and other large files using vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications while taking advantage of the multi-channel operations in IEEE 1609.4. We also discuss the results from a simulation study using the ns-3 network simulator to closely replicate the WAVE environment discussed in the IEEE 802.11p and 1609 draft standards. Realistic vehicle traces were used in the simulation study. The results show that the methods developed in this research scale very well for increasing vehicle densities.
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Khodaei, Mohammad, Papadimitratos, Panos · arXiv (Cornell University) · 2018
In spite of progress in securing Vehicular Communication (VC) systems, there is no consensus on how to distribute Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). The main challenges lie exactly in (i) crafting an efficient and timely distribution of CRLs for numerous anonymous credentials, pseudonyms, (ii) maintaining strong privacy for vehicles prior to revocation events, even with honest-but-curious system entities, (iii) and catering to computation and communication constraints of on-board units with intermittent connectivity to the infrastructure. Relying on peers to distribute the CRLs is a double-edged sword: abusive peers could "pollute" the process, thus degrading the timely CRLs distribution. In this paper, we propose a vehicle-centric solution that addresses all these challenges and thus closes a gap in the literature. Our scheme radically reduces CRL distribution overhead: each vehicle receives CRLs corresponding only to its region of operation and its actual trip duration. Moreover, a "fingerprint" of CRL 'pieces' is attached to a subset of (verifiable) pseudonyms for fast CRL 'piece' validation (while mitigating resource depletion attacks abusing the CRL distribution). Our experimental evaluation shows that our scheme is efficient, scalable, dependable, and practical: with no more than 25 KB/s of traffic load, the latest CRL can be delivered to 95% of the vehicles in a region (50x50 KM) within 15s, i.e., more than 40 times faster than the state-of-the-art. Overall, our scheme is a comprehensive solution that complements standards and can catalyze the deployment of secure and privacy-protecting VC systems.
Cited by 0Open access
Jiming Chen, Xianghui Cao, Liang Yu et al. · Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing · 2009
Abstract Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) emerges as a promising technology and has chances of very likely to be deployed in the coming years. The security of vehicular networks will be an important way to facilitate road safety. In this paper, we are concerned with the problem of effective and efficient distribution of the certificate revocation units (RSUs) in vehicular networks. We propose a novel distributed approach by introducing mobile nodes that have public safety. An optimal route for mobile nodes is designed to cover blind areas under both delay and cost constraints. The performances of the movement‐assisted approach are measured and evaluated by extensive experiments in large scale networks for Certificate Revocation List (CRL) distribution in VANET. The results show that the proposed movement‐assisted approach obviously improves the performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Yasuyuki Seita, Toru Nakanishi · IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences · 2019
In ID-based user authentications, a privacy problem can occur, since the service provider (SP) can accumulate the user's use history from the user ID. As a solution to that problem, group signatures are researched. One of important issues in the group signatures is the user revocation. Previously, an efficient revocable scheme with signing/verification of constant complexity was proposed. In this scheme, users are managed by a binary tree, and a list of revoked user information, called a revocation list (RL), is used for revocation. However, the scheme suffers from the large RL. Recently, an extended scheme has been proposed, where the RL size is reduced by compressing RL. On the other hand, there is a problem that some overhead occurs in the authentication as a price for reducing the size of RL. In this research, we propose an extended scheme where the authentication is sped up by reducing the number of zero-knowledge proofs. Furthermore, we implemented it on a PC and shows the effectiveness. The verification time is about 30% shorter than the previous scheme.
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Hyungon Kim · Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information · 2016
To verify the trustworthiness of messages, public key certificates and certificate revocation list(CRL) has been standardized for vehicular networks. However, timely distribution of large CRLs to vehicles should be more elaborated with low bandwidth utilization from a practical point of view. To address this concern, we propose a CRL distribution scheme using long term evolution(LTE) point-to-multicast transmission, namely the enhanced multimedia broadcast multicast service(eMBMS). The schem is much more resource efficient than the existing unicast CRL distribution schemes for vehicular networks and it allows realizing the regional CRL distribution schemes efficiently in LTE network. By means of ns-3 simulation, we analyze the performance, latency, and execution time of the scheme in terms of varying coverage of the multimedia broadcast multicast service over single frequency network (MBFSN).
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