Skip to content
Free planNo credit card requiredStart writing
AI for Research home
AI for Research home
Dashboard
Sign inGet started

Search 250 million research papers

Read the abstract, see who wrote it and who cites it, and get the citation in APA, MLA, Chicago or Harvard.

About 10,000 papers for “Self-reference”

"Self-Reference"

University of Pittsburgh Digital Library

Typescript document(s).

Cited by 0

Self-Reference

Vincent Fella Hendricks, Stig Andur Pedersen, Thomas Bolander · Research at the University of Copenhagen (University of Copenhagen) · 2009

Cited by 0

Self-Reference

Carol Rovane · The Journal of Philosophy · 1993

Analyse de l'objection de John McDowell a l'approche psychologique neolockeienne de l'identite personnelle (Derek Parfit), insoutenable parce qu'incompatible avec la nature et la phenomenologie de la reflexion a la premiere personne.

Cited by 20

Self-Reference

University of Pittsburgh Digital Library

Handwritten notes.

Cited by 0

Self-Reference

N. S. K. Hellerstein · Series on knots and everything · 1997

Cited by 0

Self-Reference

Petr Hájek, Pavel Pudlák · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2017

A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.

Cited by 0

Self-Reference

Alex M. Andrew · IFSR international series on systems science and engineering · 2009

Cited by 0

Self-Reference

University of Pittsburgh Digital Library

Handwritten notes.

Cited by 0

Self-Reference

University of Pittsburgh Digital Library

Handwritten notes.

Cited by 0

Self-reference and self-awareness

Sydney Shoemaker · 2003

Abstract If we consider the logical powers of first-person statements and the role played by the first-person pronoun in communication, nothing seems clearer than that in all first-person statements, including “avowals,” the word ‘I’ functions as a singular term or singular referring expression. Statements expressed by the sentence “I feel pain” have it in common with those expressed by sentences like “He feels pain” and “Jones feels pain” that they contradict the proposition “Nobody feels pain” and entail the proposition “Someone feels pain.” In these and other ways “I feel pain” behaves logically as a value of the propositional function “X feels pain.” Moreover, in all first-person statements, including “psychological” or “experience” statements, the word ‘I’ serves the function of identifying for the audience the subject to which the predicate of the statement must apply if the statement is to be true (what it indicates, of course, is that the subject is the speaker, the maker of the statement). And this is precisely the function of a referring expression.

Cited by 17

Self-Concernment without Self-Reference

Sá Pereira, Roberto · HHU Journals · 2021

This paper is a new defense of the old orthodox view that self-consciousness requires self-concepts. My defense relies on two crucial constraints. The first is what I call Bermúdez’s Constraint (2007), that is, the view that any attribution of content must account for the intentional behavior of the subject that reflects her own way of understanding the world. The second is the well-known Generality Constraint of Evans (1982), which is also termed the recombinability constraint. The claim I want to support in this paper is the following: Since whether and to what extent we can attribute to non-linguistic creatures and prelinguistic infants genuine knowing self-reference or de se contents is an open empirical question, the proponents of the nonconceptual self-consciousness face a dilemma. If we are convinced that the available empirical evidence is overwhelming, I argue--based on Evans’s Generality Constraint--that these self-representations are nothing but primitive prelinguistic self-concepts. However, if we are convinced that the available empirical evidence is not persuasive, I maintain--relying on Bermudez’s Constraint--that we do better by assuming that the subject is not self-represented. The content of her experiences and thoughts are best modeled as simple selfless propositional functions that are true or false relative to the subject of these experiences and thoughts. I refer to this as self-concernment without self-reference. Thus, against the recent ingenious work of Peacocke (2014), I claim that there is no compelling reason for postulating nonconceptual middle level self-representation, between self-concernment and conceptual self-reference. However, as I hope to make clear, my claim is quite different from those of other recent oppositions to the idea of nonconceptual self-consciousness. According to the thesis of self-concernment without self-reference, the contents of experiences and thoughts are selfless propositional functions, true or false relative to the bearer of the respective mental states.

Cited by 0Open access