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About 454 papers for “Stream cipher attack”

Attack Stream Cipher By Using Cipher System Only

K. M. Hussein · SHILAP Revista de lepidopterología · 2017

Attack stream cipher system , using cipher text only , depends on the characteristics of plain teKt language and the randomness of the key , that used in encryption , without having detailed k.nuwh:dgt:: uf cipher algorithm by benefiting from the balance between O's and I' in the key to reduce the probability of key space.

Cited by 0Open access

Distinguishing Attack on Stream Cipher Yamb

Hongjun Wu And, Hongjun Wu, Bart Preneel · 2005

Stream cipher Yamb is a submission to the ECRYPT stream cipher project. In this paper, we point out that the keystream generated from Yamb can be distinguished from random with about 2 58 outputs.

Cited by 0

Performing fault attack on trivium stream cipher

Ong, Shu Wei · DR-NTU (Nanyang Technological University) · 2017

Fault attack is referred to as an attack that targets mainly on cryptographic algorithms of a smart card system. With the increasing demand for convenience and advancing technology, smart card has become a popular form of transaction; the importance of cyber security cannot be overstated. Especially for many technological advanced countries where there is a high usage of smart card system. Sensitive information is required to be protected through concealment from attacks performed by personnel with malicious intention.
\nIn this report, the techniques of various fault models and cryptography to conceal cryptographic secrets in the tarn per-resistant system are discussed [1]. Through analysing the fault attack carried out on the system, findings can be used to identify the system’s vulnerabilities. Thus, users can further enhance their systems that are leveraging on such cryptography techniques.

Cited by 0

The Boomerang Attack on ChaCha Stream Cipher Permutation

Nasratullah Ghafoori, Atsuko Miyaji · 2024

The ChaCha stream cipher, deployed in TLS 1.3, plays a significant role in internet security. ChaCha's security has been well-studied against differential and differential-linear attacks. However, its resilience against variations of differential cryptanalysis has remained uncertain over the past decade. For the first time, we study the security of the ChaCha against boomerang cryptanalysis. The boomerang attack is a variation of differential cryptanalysis. It combines two separate differential properties from different parts of a cipher into a new differ-ential for the entire cipher, and it occurs with a probability of <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$p^{2}q^{2}$</tex>, which requires both properties to be satisfied twice. We also show that for some attack positions in ChaCha, the probability could increase to <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$p^{2}$</tex>, which further improves the attack complexity of ChaCha. In addition, we introduce an algorithm for boomerang attacks on the ChaCha. To illustrate the effectiveness of boomerang cryptanalysis, we attack ChaCha 6 and ChaCha 7. We found that a boomerang attack with a total of <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$2^{4.587}$</tex> and <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$2^{5.99}$</tex> adaptively chosen plaintext and ciphertext is needed to distinguish ChaCha 6 and ChaCha 7 from a random permutation, respectively.

Cited by 1

Chosen ciphertext attack on a chaotic stream cipher

Zhuosheng Lin, Simin Yu, Jinhu Lii · 2018

This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed 3D chaotic self-synchronization stream cipher. Ac­cording to the chosen-ciphertext attack, a single key decipher algorithm is further investigated. First, multiple pairs of plaintext-ciphertext are obtained by choosing the corresponding multiple frames of ciphertext as fixed values. And then a set of possible estimated values for this single key is acquired by utilizing among one pair of plaintext-ciphertext. Fi­nally, the only estimated value that satisfies the all conditions of multiple pairs of plaintext-ciphertext is determined, as an estimated value from the set of possible estimated values. Security performance analysis results have shown that, under the condition that only one unknown key needs to be deciphered while the remaining keys are all known, the proposed algorithm can respectively decipher each individual key accurately. In addition, the attack complexity of the proposed method is lower than that of the exhaustive attack.

Cited by 3

Another attack on A5/1 [GSM stream cipher]

Patrik Ekdahl, Thomas Johansson · 2002

A5/1 is a stream cipher used in the GSM system. Several time-memory trade-off attacks against A5/1 have been proposed previously. This paper presents a completely different attack, based on ideas from correlation attacks.

Cited by 6

A new distinguish attack against ABC stream cipher

Abolfazl Falahati, Nasour Bagheri, Majid Naderi et al. · International Conference on Advanced Communication Technology · 2007

ABC is a synchronous stream cipher proposed by Anashin, Bogdanov, Kizhvatov and Kumar as a candidate for ECRYPT Project (call for Stream Cipher). ABC cipher consists of three component named A, B, and C and gets a key and an initial vector (IV) each of 128-bit length. In this paper we propose a new distinguish attack to finding the internal state of component B and C of ABC algorithm in time 88 complexity of 2. This attack is completely retrieves internal state of those components by analyzing the 2 <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">32</sup> 32-bits word sequences of C component output of this cipher.

Cited by 0

Conditional Differential Attack on Lightweight Stream Cipher Atom

Xiaojuan Lu, Zixin Tan, Hongcai Xin · 2025

Knellwolf et al. introduced a conditional differential attack on NFSR-based cryptosystems at ASIACRYPT 2010. Since then, this method has been extensively employed to evaluate the security of various cryptographic algorithms with Grain family structures. Atom is a small-state stream cipher with a 159-bit internal state, based on the Grain family structure, and offers 128-bit security. It was proposed by Subhadeep Banik et al. in ToSC 2021. Given its structure and security claims, Atom presents an interesting target for further cryptanalysis. In this paper, we conduct a detailed study of conditional differential attacks on Atom. We first investigate the difference propagation of roundreduced Atom with differential algebraic transitional form (DATF) technique introduced by Liu et al. and develop an input difference selection strategy. Next, we present a condition imposing algorithm to handle the complicated conditions. We revisit previous research and show that our algorithm can control differential propagation over the same number of rounds (0–15 rounds) using just 21 conditions, a significant reduction from the 98 conditions required by prior methods. Finally, we apply the conditional differential attack to 51-round Atom, enabling the recovery of 3 key bits with data and time complexities of 2^29. The distinguisher of 51-round Atom has been thoroughly verified through practical experiments conducted on a 4.20GHz AMD 7950X3D CPU. To the best of our knowledge, this is the best result of conditional differential attack on round-reduced Atom reported in the publicly available literature.

Cited by 0

Improved Key Recovery Attack on the BEAN Stream Cipher

Hui Wang, Martin Hell, Thomas Johansson et al. · IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences · 2013

BEAN is a newly proposed lightweight stream cipher adopting Fibonacci FCSRs. It is designed for very constrained environments and aims at providing a balance between security, efficiency and cost. A weakness in BEAN was first found by Ågren and Hell in 2011, resulting in a key recovery attack slightly better than brute force. In this paper, we present new correlations between state and keystream with large statistical advantage, leading to a much more efficient key recovery attack. The time and data complexities of this attack are 257.53 and 259.94, respectively. Moreover, two new output functions are provided as alternatives, which are more efficent than the function used in BEAN and are immune to all attacks proposed on the cipher. Also, suggestions for improving the FCSRs are given.

Cited by 3

Fault attack on FPGA implementations of Trivium stream cipher

F. E. Potestad-Ordóńez, C. J. Jiménez-Fernández, M. Valencia · 2016

This article presents the development of an experimental system to introduce faults in Trivium stream ciphers implemented on FPGA. The developed system has made possible to analyze the vulnerability of these implementations against fault attacks. The developed system consists of a mechanism that injects small pulses in the clock signal, and elements that analyze if a fault has been introduced, the number of faults introduced and its position in the inner state. The results obtained demonstrate the vulnerability of these implementations against fault attacks. As far as we know, this is the first time that experimental results of fault attack over Trivium are presented.

Cited by 16

Scan-Based Attack against Trivium Stream Cipher Using Scan Signatures

Mika Fujishiro, Masao Yanagisawa, Nozomu Togawa · IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences · 2014

Trivium is a synchronous stream cipher using three shift registers. It is designed to have a simple structure and runs at high speed. A scan-based side-channel attack retrieves secret information using scan chains, one of design-for-test techniques. In this paper, a scan-based side-channel attack method against Trivium using scan signatures is proposed. In our method, we reconstruct a previous internal state in Trivium one by one from the internal state just when a ciphertext is generated. When we retrieve the internal state, we focus on a particular 1-bit position in a collection of scan chains and then we can attack Trivium even if the scan chain includes other registers than internal state registers in Trivium. Experimental results show that our proposed method successfully retrieves a plaintext from a ciphertext generated by Trivium.

Cited by 7

Related Key Chosen IV Attack on Grain-128a Stream Cipher

Lin Ding, Jie Guan · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · 2013

The well-known stream cipher Grain-128 is a variant version of Grain v1 with 128-bit secret key. Grain v1 is a stream cipher which has successfully been chosen as one of seven finalists by European eSTREAM project. Yet Grain-128 is vulnerable against some recently introduced attacks. A new version of Grain-128 with authentication, named Grain-128a, is proposed by Ågren, Hell, Johansson, and Meier. The designers claimed that Grain-128a is strengthened against all known attacks and observations on the original Grain-128. So far there exists no attack on Grain-128a except a differential fault attack by Banik, Maitra, and Sarkar. In this paper, we give some observations on Grain-128a, and then propose a related key chosen IV attack on Grain-128a based on these observations. Our attack can recover the 128-bit secret key of Grain-128a with a computational complexity of <formula formulatype="inline" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex Notation="TeX">$2^{96.322} $</tex></formula> , requiring <formula formulatype="inline" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <tex Notation="TeX">$2^{96} $</tex></formula> chosen IVs and <formula formulatype="inline" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex Notation="TeX">$2^{103.613} $</tex> </formula> keystream bits. The success probability of our attack is 0.632. This related key attack is “minimal” in the sense that it only requires two related keys. The result shows that our attack is much better than an exhaustive key search in the related key setting.

Cited by 25