Eva Picardi · 2022
Abstract A characteristic element of Frege’s ideography is the assertion sign. This chapter explores its role and its connections with Frege’s conception of assertion, truth, and judgement. It is noted that Frege’s views about the assertion sign changed over the years and that they deeply influenced the work of the early Wittgenstein as well as Frank Ramsey’s thought. The key contention is that by the end of his career, Frege did not think of “true” as indicative of the essence of logic; rather, what is of the essence of logic for him was contained in the assertoric force with which a sentence is uttered, whence the key role of the assertion sign in his ideography.
Cited by 1
Courtney Zhan · Apress eBooks · 2023
Without assertions (often known as checks), a test script is incomplete. Test syntax frameworks, such as MS VSTest, provide an assertion syntax. Common assertions for testing web applications are
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Turri, John · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 2015
A lexicographical entry on 'assertion'.
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Palgrave Macmillan eBooks · 2014
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Larry E.Sullivan · The SAGE Glossary of the Social and Behavioral Sciences · 2009
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2008
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Neil Renton · 2025
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Brittlebank, K · eCite Digital Repository (University of Tasmania) · 2003
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Turri, John · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 2015
A lexicographical entry on 'assertion'.
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2026
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M.S. Green · Elsevier eBooks · 2026
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Ladislav Koreň · 2021
So-called dialectical approaches offer an attractive account of assertions as embedded in a larger norm-governed practice of reasoned discourse. But their proponents have rarely asked about what function such a practice could have fulfilled in the lives of human beings that could explain why those beings could have elaborated it. In this chapter, I address this challenge by reconstructing a pragmatic genealogy of assertoric practice and its intimate relation to reasoned discourse. Taking inspiration from the recent “state of nature epistemology,” I describe a discursive state of nature inhabited by simple yet already sociable human beings who stand to benefit from coordination, cooperation, and communication. I then reconsider why and how creatures could be under pressure to elaborate a communicative practice with the characteristic features that prominent dialectical accounts attribute to assertions. Finally, I show how that account can accommodate a number of characteristic features—social, normative, epistemic—that assertions might be claimed to have.
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Geach, Peter · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 1965
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Geach, Peter · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 1965
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Marsili, Neri, Peter Pagin · Archivio istituzionale della ricerca (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna) · 2021
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P. T. Geach · The Philosophical Review · 1965
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Robert Stalnaker · 1978
Cited by 794
Dictionary of Existential Psychotherapy and Counselling · 2011
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Michael Potter · Oxford University Press eBooks · 2008
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Brittlebank, K (15499214) · Figshare · 2003
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