Garrett Cullity · International Encyclopedia of Ethics · 2024
Impartiality is primarily a feature of deliberation: the feature it has when it is not unduly influenced by the deliberator's own interests, preferences, or loyalties. Relatedly, it can be a feature of judgment (especially judgment concerning goodness and badness); it can also be ascribed to the point of view that is adopted in deliberating or judging impartially, and to persons who adopt that point of view. This gives rise to several different projects in moral philosophy, offering different explanations of the relationship between morality and impartiality.
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Squires, JA · Bristol Research (University of Bristol) · 2000
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Matthew H. Kramer · 2009
This chapter contains sections titled: The Ingredients of Impartiality Why Does Impartiality Matter? Challenges to Epistemic Reliability Conclusion
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JA Squires · Explore Bristol Research · 2000
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Steven J. Jensen · 2023
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Michael D. Bayles · Law and philosophy library · 1990
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Michael P. Fronda · The Encyclopedia of Ancient History · 2012
Abstract Ancient authors and their audiences had some sense that the writing of history should be free from undue partisanship, malice, and favoritism. However, ancient expectations and assumptions differed greatly from the modern concepts of historical impartiality and objectivity.
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Jan-Erik Lane · Journal of Research in Philosophy and History · 2022
Famous philosopher Brian Barry defines social justice as impartiality. Bo Rothstein follows his path when defining the concept òf corruption as partiality. Barry argued that his definition no one could “reasonable reject”, i.e., it fulfills the criterion on justice. Wright put forward the idea that action is to be explained by “the thing to do”, i.e., what is reasonable. Perhaps, then partiality is the thing not to do because reasonable rejected?
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Alain Marciano, Alain Marciano, Alain Marciano et al. · 2025
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Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society · 2008
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Joan Marques · 2026
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Maria-Artemis Kolliniati · 2024
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2002
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Peter Stone · Oxford University Press eBooks · 2011
This chapter demonstrates why the lottery principle implies the just lottery rule—why the sanitizing effect of lotteries explains when and why lotteries are justified in allocating goods. The chapter does so by formulating certain conditions that allocations must satisfy in order to qualify as just. Some of these conditions apply to the evaluation of the outcomes of the allocative process. These include the conditions of efficiency, priority, and equality. But other conditions apply to the evaluation of the actions taken during the allocative process. Those conditions can be summarized in the principle of impartiality. That principle demands that the conditions of efficiency, priority, and equality be satisfied whenever possible. But when indeterminacy arises—when two or more claimants have equally good claims, and it is possible to satisfy some but not all of them—these conditions might be impossible to satisfy simultaneously. In such a case, impartiality demands that the agent avoid any reasons at all while resolving the indeterminacy. A lottery can do this, and so the demands of impartiality require the sanitizing effect of lotteries.
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Bulletin of Miscellaneous Information (Royal Gardens Kew)
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Ross Cranston · 2025
Abstract Impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in decision-making are the supreme judicial values. They are essential to public confidence in the judiciary and the legitimacy of judicial power. Impartiality is not in relation to outcome in the sense that fidelity to law obliges the judge to favour the side with the best case on the law and the facts. Rather it means that the judge accords equal concern and respect to both sides and acts, as the judicial oath puts it, to do right to all manner of people according to law ‘without fear or favour, affection or ill will’. Impartiality is given effect through the rules which disqualify judges from deciding a case if they have an interest, association, opinion, or prejudgement demonstrating actual or apprehended bias. The obligation to act impartially accepts that judges have experiences, sympathies, and opinions, but requires them to be sensitive to their own biases and consider a case with an open mind. There is now a greater awareness of unconscious biases and heuristics and that judges are no less vulnerable to these than other decision makers, although the focus in judicial decision-making on legally relevant matters along with the procedural standards of fairness should mitigate their impact. The difficulties under current procedures in judges themselves deciding whether they should recuse themselves for bias, or at least apparent bias, has led to calls for a more sophisticated ‘ethical infrastructure’ with a discretionary procedure for referring to other judges the more difficult disqualification issues and with a streamlined procedure for interlocutory appeals against a judge’s decision about recusal.
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Encyclopedia of Evaluation · 2005
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Brian Barry · 1995
Abstract My choice of an epigraph drawn from Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies1 is not a casual one. Looking back later at the writing of that book, which was completed in 1943 (though only published later), Popper wrote: ‘My own voice began to sound to me as if it came from the distant past—like the voice of one of the hopeful social reformers of the eighteenth or even the seventeenth century.’ Those words were written in 1950, and Popper added that his mood of depression had by then passed. Fifty years later, I find the state of mind that Popper recalled having been in during 1943 only too familiar.
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Bernard Gert · 1998
Abstract Impartiality has been almost universally misdescribed by philosophers. Like simultaneity, impartiality is usually taken to be a simpler concept than it really is. Einstein made the conceptual discovery that it was inadequate to characterize the simultaneity of two events by simply considering those two events. The point of view of the observer must also be considered. Einstein showed that it is incomplete to say merely “A and B occurred simultaneously.” A complete characterization requires saying ‘‘A and B occurred simultaneously to an observer at C.” This point had not been previously recognized because all of the known observers were at C. Thus it seemed sufficient to use the simpler characterization of simultaneity. Once it is clear that observers need not be at C, but can be at D or E, it becomes apparent that A and B can occur simultaneously with regard to one observer, but not occur simultaneously with regard to another. There is no answer to the question “But did A and B really occur simultaneously?” because this question presupposes an account of simultaneity that Einstein has shown to be inadequate.
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Joad Raymond · 2014
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