Terence Horgan · The Monist · 2013
I will focus here on the following questions. (1) What constitutes the most fundamental kind of semantic content in thought and language, the kind of content sometimes called Original intentionality'? (2) Could suitably sophisticated robots be capable of original intentionality, solely by virtue of the functional roles played by their internal states vis-a-vis (i) other internal states, (ii) input and output states, and (iii) causal/historical connections linking such internal and bodily states to states of the external environment?1 (3) Could suitably sophisticated robots be capable of original intentionality in some other way? (4) How does Searle 's famous thought experiment bear upon questions (l)-(3)?In section 1, 1 will summarize recent work of mine in philosophy of mind - often collaborative with George Graham and/or John Tienson - that bears on question (l).2 The answer to this question that my collaborators and I favor and have elsewhere defended is this: original intentionality is what we call phenomenal intentionality. Phenomenal consciousness, which is an intrinsic feature of mentality, is itself inherently intentional. Phenomenal intentionality, in turn, grounds other kinds of intentionality that are metaphysically less fundamental - specifically, (a) certain kinds of mental reference (e.g., to concrete individuals and to natural kinds), and (b) the intentionality of public language.In section 2, 1 will address questions (2)-(4), on the basis of my favored answer to question (1). Given the contention that original intentionality is phenomenal intentionality, the answer to question (2) is no: original intentionality requires phenomenal consciousness with suitably rich intentional content; so, since phenomenal consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mentality whereas functional role is entirely relational and nonintrinsic, original intentionality cannot be constituted solely by the possession of internal states with some specific functional role. The answer to question (3) is maybe: it depends upon whether or not certain internal physical states instantiated by the robot would not only play suitable functional roles within the robot, but in addition would be states upon which the pertinent states of phenomenal consciousness - phenomenally intentional states - are supervenient. And the answer to question (4) is this: the real moral of Searle 's Chinese room thought experiment is that genuine original intentionality requires the presence of internal states with intrinsic phenomenal character that is inherently intentional - a feature that cannot be possessed by any entity (either robotic or flesh-and-blood) solely by virtue of the functional roles played by its internal states.In section 3, 1 will set forth a new argument in support of the contention that original intentionality is phenomenal intentionality. The argument will proceed via a series of thought-experimental scenarios that collectively constitute a sequence, similar in structure to a series of visual images that gradually change (say) from a good depiction of Elvis into a good depiction of Bill Clinton. Searle's original Chinese room thought experiment will be the initial stage in the morph sequence, occupying the Elvis slot.1. Phenomenal Intentionality, Externalistic Intentionality, and Linguistic MeaningMuch of the literature in recent philosophy of mind has embraced some version or other of functionalism concerning intentional mental states - and, moreover, strong externalism about mental intentionality. Roughly and generically, strong externalism is the view that all mental intentionality depends constitutively on certain external connections (e.g., causal, and/or covariational, and/or historical, and/or evolutionary) between a creature with mentality and that creature's wider environment.Lately Graham and Tienson and I have been articulating a general approach to mental intentionality that is very much at odds with the various versions of strong externalism that have recently been fashionable in philosophy of mind. …
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2004
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Daniel C. O’Connell, Sabine Kowal · 2008
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Doris Noel Ugarriza · Holistic Nursing Practice · 2002
Intentionality is an important concept for nurses to study for professional and theoretical reasons. Lewis states that intentionality is best studied within an active, rather than reactive, worldview. This article is a level-by-level outline of Lewis' five-level model for the study of intentionality. These levels are: necessity, interactive necessity, action intent, divergent intent, and conscious intent. Newman's tri-part categorization of nursing theory paradigms (particularate-deterministic, interactive-integrative, and unitary-transformative) proves to be a useful framework to compare the Lewis model of intentionality with nursing theory. Examples from nursing theory development, such as the Roy adaptation model, chronotherapeutics, Rogers' theory of unitary human being, health as expanding consciousness, and therapeutic touch, are used to support all five levels of intentionality in providing guidance for practice and research by nurse theorists.
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Michael Wreen · International Studies in Philosophy · 1987
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2015
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Barbara Gail Montero · 2022
Abstract ‘Intentionality’ asks: what is distinctive about the mind? Some philosophers have argued that the mark of the mental is intentionality: the mind’s ability to represent things in the world. Beliefs, perceptions, desires, and hopes are intentional since they are about, or in some sense point to, things in the world. Different intentional states are thought to have distinct ‘directions of fit’. There are four interrelated puzzling features of intentionality. In addition, there are three theories of intentionality (the pictorial, causal, and teleological). Does intentionality pose a problem for physicalism?
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Yvette V. Lapayese · 2019
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SpringerReference · 2012
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Michelle Montague · 2018
This chapter covers the role played by Franz Brentano in bringing the topic of intentionality as the unity of consciousness, the fundamental classification of mental phenomena, and the role of emotions in the authors’ knowledge of value in addition to offering theories of intentionality and consciousness. The first is the idea that Brentano's theory of intentionality has dualist metaphysical implications. The author concludes with a few remarks about some recent theories of consciousness and intentionality that do much better than representationalism in capturing some of the spirit of Brentano's philosophy. The "transparentist" claims about what we can and can't be aware of in having conscious experience are in direct conflict with Brentano's theory of consciousness. This feature of Brentano's theory not only directly conflicts with the transparency thesis; it also makes clear that the way in which intentionality and consciousness are constitutively related, according to each theory, is very different.
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José Hugo Gonçalves Magalhães, João Paulo Maciel de Araujo · 2022
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Parker, Karen L · Scholars Crossing (Liberty University) · 2010
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Segal, Gabriel · SAS-Space (University of London) · 2005
IntroductionI shall begin with a sketchy historical introduction to the topic, which will help bring into focus some of the pressing issues for philosophy in the 21 st century. Brentano's Problem"Intentionality" as it is typically used in analytic philosophy, meaning, roughly representation or 'aboutness', derives from the work of Franz Brentano.Brentano (Brentano 1874, quoted in Chisholm, 1967) wrote
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Jacob Neusner · 2002
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D. M. Armstrong · 2018
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The SAGE Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry · 2007
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John Wilson · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 1972
In Chapter vi I restricted the range of application of ‘object’ to items in the world. I said that although well-founded emotions could be said to have an object, malfounded emotions, based on a mistaken existential belief, could not. I said that ‘prepositional’ emotions, like fear that something is the case, did not, according to my usage, have objects. But I suggested that there might be some more comprehensive notion of intentionality such that all these emotions are intentional. I suggested also that emotions might share this property with beliefs, desires, and other mental states and dispositions. Philosophers have generally taken these various types of mental states and dispositions to be importantly similar, and have referred to the respect in which they are similar as their intentionality. Although they have explained this notion by use of objectterminology, it may be possible to offer an alternative account.
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David Rosenthal · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · 1986
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Jan Nuyts · John Benjamins Publishing Company eBooks · 2002
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Richard Double · Philosophical Studies · 1986
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