article · Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design · 2023
Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players
Cited by 0Open access
Abstract
We consider a setting in which a mechanism designer must choose the appropriate social alternative depending on the state of nature. We study the problem of optimal design and demonstrate that a mechanism which allocates resources so as to achieve the social optimum and assigns payments equal to the posterior expected utility of the agent at the social optimum, is an epsilon-optimal mechanism for environments with many players.
Cite this paper
Basu, P. (2023). Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players. Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 8(1), 97–106. https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004
Basu, Pathikrit. “Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players.” Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, vol. 8, no. 1, 2023, pp. 97–106, https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004.
Basu, Pathikrit. 2023. “Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players.” Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 8 (1): 97–106. https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004.
Basu, P. (2023) ‘Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players’, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 8(1), pp. 97–106. Available at: https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004.
@article{basu2023optimal,
title = {{Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players}},
author = {Basu, Pathikrit},
journal = {Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design},
volume = {8},
number = {1},
pages = {97--106},
year = {2023},
doi = {10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004}
}Made from the index record. Check names, capitalisation and page numbers against the paper. Need another style? AI for Research has over 10,000.
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