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article · Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design · 2023

Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players

Pathikrit Basu

Cited by 0Open access

Abstract

We consider a setting in which a mechanism designer must choose the appropriate social alternative depending on the state of nature. We study the problem of optimal design and demonstrate that a mechanism which allocates resources so as to achieve the social optimum and assigns payments equal to the posterior expected utility of the agent at the social optimum, is an epsilon-optimal mechanism for environments with many players.

Cite this paper

APA 7

Basu, P. (2023). Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players. Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 8(1), 97–106. https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004

MLA 9

Basu, Pathikrit. “Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players.” Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, vol. 8, no. 1, 2023, pp. 97–106, https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004.

Chicago

Basu, Pathikrit. 2023. “Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players.” Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 8 (1): 97–106. https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004.

Harvard

Basu, P. (2023) ‘Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players’, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 8(1), pp. 97–106. Available at: https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004.

BibTeX
@article{basu2023optimal,
  title = {{Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players}},
  author = {Basu, Pathikrit},
  journal = {Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design},
  volume = {8},
  number = {1},
  pages = {97--106},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004}
}

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