Skip to content
Free planNo credit card requiredStart writing
AI for Research home
AI for Research home
Dashboard
Sign inGet started

Search 250 million research papers

Read the abstract, see who wrote it and who cites it, and get the citation in APA, MLA, Chicago or Harvard.

About 3,536 papers for “probability judgment”

Probability Judgment in Medicine

Donald A. Redelmeier, Derek J. Koehler, Varda Liberman et al. · Medical Decision Making · 1995

Research in cognitive psychology has indicated that alternative descriptions of the same event can give rise to different probability judgments. This observation has led to the development of a descriptive account, called support theory, which assumes that the judged probability of an explicit description of an event (that lists specific possibilities) generally exceeds the judged probability of an implicit description of the same event (that does not mention specific possibilities). To investigate this assumption in medical judgment, the authors presented physicians with brief clinical scenarios describing individual patients and elicited diagnostic and prognostic probability judgments. The results showed that the physicians tended to discount unspecified possibilities, as predicted by support theory. The authors suggest that an awareness of the discrepancy between intuitive judgments and the laws of chance may provide opportunities for improving medical decision making.

Cited by 212

Culture and Probability Judgment Accuracy

Julia Lechuga, John S. Wiebe · Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology · 2011

A well-established phenomenon in the judgment and decision-making tradition is the overconfidence one places in the amount of knowledge that one possesses. Overconfidence or probability judgment accuracy varies not only individually but also across cultures. However, research efforts to explain cross-cultural variations in the overconfidence phenomenon have seldom been made. In Study 1, the authors compared the probability judgment accuracy of U.S. Americans (N = 108) and Mexican participants (N = 100). In Study 2, they experimentally primed culture by randomly assigning English/Spanish bilingual Mexican Americans (N = 195) to response language. Results of both studies replicated the cross-cultural variation of probability judgment accuracy previously observed in other cultural groups. U.S. Americans displayed less overconfidence when compared to Mexicans. These results were then replicated in bilingual participants, when culture was experimentally manipulated with language priming. Holistic reasoning did not account for the cross-cultural variation of overconfidence. Suggestions for future studies are discussed.

Cited by 29

Descriptive theory of probability judgment

Jonathan Baron · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2023

The fifth edition of the classic text Thinking and Deciding updates the broad overview of the field of judgments and decisions offered in previous editions. It covers the normative standards used to evaluate conclusions, such as logic, probability, and various forms of utility theory. It explains descriptive accounts of departures from these standards, largely in terms of principles of cognitive psychology, emphasizing the distinction between search processes and inferences. Chapters cover decisions under risk, decision analysis, moral decisions and social dilemmas, and decisions about the future. Although the book assumes no particular prerequisites beyond introductory high-school algebra, it is most suited to advanced undergraduates, early graduate students, and active researchers in related fields, such as business, politics, law, medicine, economics, and philosophy.

Cited by 0

Conditional Probability and Human Judgment

Li, Xi, Ran, Yaxuan · Open Science Framework · 2022

This study aims to investigate the irrationality of people's judgment of P(a|c) under the combination of different level of P(a) and P(c), specifically comparing “high P(c) and low P(a)” and “low P(c) and high P(a)”, which is called as conditional probability bias. This study uses a judgment scenario of disease which includes the infection rate and disability rate.

Cited by 0Open access

Languages and designs for probability judgment

G. Shafer, Amos Tversky · Cognitive Science · 1985

Theories of subjective probability are viewed as formal languages for analyzing evidence and expressing degrees of belief. This article focuses on two probability langauges, the Bayesian language and the language of belief functions (Shafer, 1976). We describe and compare the semantics (i.e., the meaning of the scale) and the syntax (i.e., the formal calculus) of these languages. We also investigate some of the designs for probability judgment afforded by the two languages.

Cited by 6

Languages and Designs for Probability Judgment

Glenn Shafer, et al. · 1985

Theories of subjective probobility ore viewed OS formal languages for onolyzing evidence ond expressing degrees of belief. This article focuses on two probobility Iongouges, the Boyesion longuoge ond the longuoge of belief functions (Shofer, 1976). We describe and compare the semantics (i.e., the meoning of the scale) ond the syntax (i.e., the formol coIcuIus) of these Ionguoges. We also investigote some of the designs for probobility judgment afforded by the two languages.

Cited by 0

Conditional probability and human judgment 0604

Ran, Yaxuan, Li, Xi · Open Science Framework · 2022

This is an experiment of the project on conditional probability and human judgment. This study would consider whether the information intervention (i.e., telling participants to not rely on condition probability when making a judgment) can debias the conditional probability bias.

Cited by 0Open access

The enhancement effect in probability judgment

Derek J. Koehler, Lyle Brenner, Amos Tversky · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · 1997

Research has shown that the judged probability of an event depends on the specificity with which the focal and alternative hypotheses are described. In particular, unpacking the components of the focal hypothesis generally increases the judged probability of the focal hypothesis, while unpacking the components of the alternative hypothesis decreases the judged probability of the focal hypothesis. As a consequence, the judged probability of the union of disjoint events is generally less than the sum of their judged probabilities. This article shows that the total judged probability of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses increases with the degree to which the evidence is compatible with these hypotheses. This phenomenon, which we refer to as the enhancement effect, is consistent with a descriptive account of subjective probability called support theory. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Cited by 97Open access

Conditional Probability and Human Judgment 0525

Ran, Yaxuan, Li, Xi · Open Science Framework · 2022

This is an experiment of the project on conditional probability and human judgment. This study would consider how the severity of conditional events (severe+severe vs. mild+severe) influences the conditional probability bias.

Cited by 0Open access

A note on superadditive probability judgment.

Laura Macchi, Daniel N. Osherson, David H. Krantz · Psychological Review · 1999

Recent studies have demonstrated subadditivity of human probability judgment: The judged probabilities for an event partition sum to more than 1. We report conditions under which people's probability judgments are superadditive instead: The component judgments for a partition sum to less than 1. Both directions of deviation from additivity are interpreted in a common framework, in which probability judgments are often mediated by judgments of evidence. The 2 kinds of nonadditivity result from differences in recruitment of supporting evidence together with reduced processing of nonfocal propo- sitions.

Cited by 138